Ceasefire Without Peace? A Critical Analysis of Trump's Gaza Peace Plan
By Sara Canali
Sara Canali is a PhD student with the Ghent Institute for International and European Studies (GIES).
This contribution critically examines Trump’s 2025 Peace Plan for Gaza within the broader framework of his Middle East policy since coming into office in January 2025. The paper argues that, while framed as a pragmatic path to stability, the ceasefire and its twenty-point framework have coincided with continued violence and weak accountability for the violations perpetrated by Israel, and overall reveals deep asymmetries between the parties. The analysis shows how demilitarisation, technocratic governance, and investment-led reconstruction shift responsibility onto Palestinians while sidelining claims of political self-determination and territorial continuity. Rather than laying the groundwork for sustainable peace, the plan risks reproducing a form of externally managed, fragile pacification.
Introduction
Trump’s general attitude towards the “Middle East”, a conceptual category that remains both contested and contestable, has been characterised by a strong will to be identified as a pacifier in the region (Yacoubian, 2025; The White House, 2025). In parallel, the President’s focus has consistently remained on the advancement of American economic and commercial interests, primarily through the negotiation and conclusion of trade and investment agreements.
At the beginning of his second term, President Trump highlighted both changed historical considerations and revised strategic objectives for the United States (US) engagement in the Middle East, as the American energy dependence on the region has significantly been curtailed and as the commercial rapprochement with Gulf states had become increasingly central to his administration’s policy framework (The White House, 2025). Indeed, according to Trump, the Middle Eastern region is “no longer the potential source of imminent catastrophe, that it once was” (The White House, 2025, 29). The year 2025, marking the start of Trump’s second presidency, has been widely characterised by the key word “unpredictability” (Katulis, 2025c), but it has also featured a highly personalised approach to diplomacy and decision-making, directly embodied by the President himself.
While this personalised approach allows for rapid, high-profile interventions, it simultaneously poses significant challenges for the consistent follow-up and implementation of agreements (Katulis, 2025a). Such volatility and individualistic decision-making also carry the inherent risk that the peace plan for Gaza and the ceasefire implemented as of October 2025 between Israel and Hamas, one of the many diplomatic “successes” of the President, may fall outside the administration’s immediate priorities, thereby increasing the potential costs and vulnerabilities borne by the Palestinian side.
Moreover, a defining feature of the administration’s early Middle East policy has been its unconditional and unquestioned support for Israel, including explicit alignment with Prime Minister’s Netanyahu’s “policies” in Gaza (see Yacoubian, 2025; Katulis, 2025a, 2025b, 2025c).
This paper contextualises Trump’s Peace Plan for Gaza within the President’s broader policy and vision regarding the Israel-Palestine conflict, while highlighting potential challenges, pitfalls and shortcomings that will likely affect the plan’s long-term sustainability and efficacy. Accordingly, the discussion focuses on the ceasefire points, their current implementation status, and the potential implications for the political and humanitarian landscape in the region.
The Peace Plan: Trump’s Politics of Illusion and the uncertain future of Gaza
Trump’s stance on the Israel-Palestine conflict and on the war in Gaza comes as little surprise, if we look at the policies pursued during his previous administration. These culminated with the promotion of the Abraham accords as a necessary sign of normalisation and renewed partnerships between Israel and other countries in the MENA region, as well as the politically charged act of recognising Jerusalem as the “legitimate” capital of Israel, followed by the relocation of the American embassy to the city (Trump, 2017). Since returning into power in January 2025, Trump has focused on unconditionally backing Netanyahu’s positions on and future visions on Gaza, translating this support into both financial and military assistance exceeding that provided by the previous administration, while simultaneously de-prioritising safe access to the strip and delivery of humanitarian aid to civilians in Gaza (Yacoubian, 2025; Al Jazeera, 2025). Additionally, Trump has reinforced a pattern of disregarding international law in this context, notably by supporting the attack launched by Israel against Hamas in Doha (see Yacoubian, 2025; Katulis, 2025a, 2025b, 2025c). Nevertheless, much of Trump’s attention has been directed toward securing the safe return of hostages held in Gaza by Hamas and on negotiating a ceasefire, alongside efforts aimed at forging a more long-term resolution of the conflict (see The White House, 2025; BBC, 2025).
Trump’s 20-point peace plan (BBC, 2025) presents itself as a pragmatic roadmap for Gaza, yet a closer reading reveals deep structural and political imbalances. While some provisions, such as the clause on reopening of humanitarian aid (Point 2), appear constructive, they ring hollow when set against the ongoing reality of civilian deaths and the absence of accountability for violations of the ceasefire perpetrated by Israel (see Al Jazeera, 2025). In addition, evidence points to a continued weaponization of humanitarian aid by Israel, which continues to enter Gaza in a limited amount (Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 2025).
The proposal for a temporary “technocratic” government composed of “qualified Palestinians” and international experts (Point 9) further raises concerns, especially in light of the parallel creation of a “Board of Peace” chaired by the U.S. President himself, with the explicit involvement of figures such as Tony Blair, suggesting an externally imposed, colonial, and highly centralized governance model aligned more with Western political and economic interests than with Palestinian self-determination. This is reinforced by the plan’s emphasis on investment, reconstruction, and economic liberalization (Points 10–11), which frames Gaza less as a political community entitled to sovereignty and more as a development project to be managed. Moreover, the plan’s strong focus on Palestinian responsibilities—particularly through demilitarization and the establishment of an International Stabilization Force (ISF) —implicitly treats Palestinian resistance as the primary obstacle to peace while largely obscuring the structural role of Israeli occupation. Although Point 16 formally guarantees that Israel will neither occupy nor annex Gaza and provides for an eventual IDF withdrawal monitored by the ISF, the plan remains vague on enforcement mechanisms and offers no comparable constraints on Israeli military or political power. This asymmetry becomes even clearer in Point 17, which explicitly assigns blame to Hamas while avoiding meaningful language about Israeli accountability. Even the plan’s softer components, such as the proposed interfaith dialogue (Point 18), misdiagnose the conflict by treating it as a problem of mutual intolerance rather than one historically rooted in territorial dispossession, military occupation, and systemic colonial violence perpetrated by Israel. Against this backdrop, the promise of a “credible pathway to self-determination and statehood” (Point 19) appears largely rhetorical, undermined by a framework that prioritizes security, control, and economic management over genuine Palestinian political sovereignty.
Even though some of the components of the peace plan have been later “endorsed” by a UN Security Council Resolution, the status of the 20 points under international law (and therefore its potential for a successful implementation) remains unclear (Al Jazeera, 2025; El Dahshan, 2025; United Nations, 2025). It is also clear that existing violations to such ceasefire have not (yet) met any resistance from the Trump’s administration nor have they ensued any response from the United Nations. In addition, the unconditional support Trump has offered to Israel, including unquestioned military support that has indirectly allowed for the violations of the ceasefire itself, remain a valid cause for concern for the future of the plan and its potential suffocation of Palestinian agency. As already briefly discussed, the “colonial overtones of the plan” (El Dahshan, 2025) are evident in its lack of focus on the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination and their vision for a post-war reconstruction model. Alternative reconstruction proposals that place Gaza and the aspirations of its people at the centre, while attempting to overcome the pitfalls seen in post-war reconstruction plans, have been sidelined or silenced (see El Dahshan, 2025). Finally, a contentious point remains: the peace plan fails to mention the West Bank, therefore by default undermining any credible discussions around Palestinian statehood (Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 2025).
Conclusion
Overall, Trump’s presidency has opened a period of unpredictability in US foreign policy, a principle and a fact applicable beyond his middle East policy; unconventional diplomatic engagement has also been another characteristic feature of the administration since January 2025 (see also Katulis, 2025c).
The peace plan, implemented as of 10 October 2025, has not delivered the safety and relief for civilians in the Gaza strip that it might appear to promise: since its official start, Israel has violated the ceasefire more than a thousand times, killing and injuring civilians, and continuing the destruction of the strip (Al Jazeera, 2025). Key issues surrounding the peace plan include an unconditional support for Israel demonstrated by President Trump since the beginning of his term; the “suffocation” of Palestinian agency; Israel’s continued disregard for international law met with no accountability; and vagueness about the long-term plan for Gaza and the extent to which such plan may take a neo-colonial shape, introducing external forces to dictate the future of Palestinians. What has the Trump’s administration really achieved then, one year after? And what future can Gaza and Palestine be granted? Is there one future only, and should the United States be shaping it with the support of the international community through the peace plan?
Trump’s drive to conclude quick, highly visible, and politically wanted diplomatic agreements, despite potential short-term consensus, will carry long-term consequences, as any concrete planning for realistic solutions to key middle to long-term challenges in Gaza is largely absent. In general, the peace plan calls for the questioning of a genuine, long-term commitment to peace in which the agency and the suffering of Palestinians is equally recognized and respected, as well as the realistic space Trump is willing to provide and protect for Palestinian independence and absolute right to self-determination (see also Katulis, 2025c; Middle East Council, 2025).
Discussions on phase two of the ceasefire plans and a second round of negotiations are currently underway in Cairo, with an uncertain timeline over the dissolution of the Hamas government in Gaza and the many uncertainties surrounding the formation of the technocratic government supposed to guide Gaza through demilitarization and stabilisations phases - while civilians continue dying at the hand of Israel (Il Sole24Ore, 2026). Will this frail peace become more than a temporary halt to the genocide?
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