European Security Under Trump: the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly

By Tim Haesebrouck and Michelle Haas

Prof. Dr. Tim Haesebrouck is a professor with the Ghent Institute for International and European Studies (GIES).

Michelle Haas is a PhD researcher with the Ghent Institute for International and European Studies (GIES).

The erratic and coercive foreign policy behaviour during Trump’s first year back in office has prompted calls for a tougher European stance toward Washington. Yet such calls overlook a structural reality: Europe remains strongly dependent on the United States for deterrence against Russia. In consequence, a forceful pushback may feel resolute, but it is neither credible nor wise. Europe instead needs a balanced and coordinated approach that recognises the good, does not ignore the bad and avoids overreacting to the ugly. The good is that the United States has neither abandoned NATO nor fully shifted toward Russia on Ukraine, a fragile but essential alignment that Europe should avoid undermining. The bad is that Ukraine remains vulnerable to an unfavourable settlement, while Europe’s dependence allows Washington to exert pressure in other areas. Reducing this vulnerability will take time, so Europe must use its remaining leverage carefully while protecting the credibility of Article Five. The ugly, in turn, consisting of rhetorical provocations and attempts of political interference, should not distract from core strategic interests. In the coming period, it will thus be vital for Europe to preserve the good, push back the bad, and ignore the ugly.

Introduction

Trump’s first year back in office sharply intensified Europe’s security concerns. Trump questioned Washington’s commitment to NATO, adopted a conciliatory tone toward Moscow, and floated proposals on Ukraine closely aligned with Russian preferences. European worries were further amplified by a National Security Strategy depicting Europe as threatened by “civilisational erasure” and provocative rhetoric regarding Greenland. Such developments prompted calls for a tougher European stance toward Washington. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen’s recent claim that any US military action against Greenland would “spell the end of NATO” was the clearest example. Although understandable from her position, such declarations risk overlooking an undeniable structural fact: Europe remains deeply reliant on the US for deterrence against Russia. Calls for a strong push back against Washington may feel satisfying, but are neither credible nor strategically sensible.

What Europe needs is a careful and balanced approach to the Trump administration. Not every development should incite the same level of concern. Some represent genuine dangers, others offer modest reassurance, and some, although politically visible and unsettling, have only limited implications for Europe’s core interests. The key issue is to distinguish between those developments that genuinely count as the “good”, offering at least a modest sigh of relief; those that fall into the “bad”, threaten vital European interests and thus merit real concern; and those that belong to the “ugly”, politically charged but ultimately of limited strategic consequence.

Making these distinctions is essential. Europe cannot afford to abstain from reacting when necessary, nor can it treat every hostile signal from Washington as equally consequential. Overreacting to the merely ugly wastes political energy and distracts from the genuinely dangerous, while failing to recognise the good obscures the opportunities that still exist to protect Europe’s vital interests.

The Good

Despite a tumultuous year, not everything has been as bad as some had feared. The worst case scenario of a complete US abandonment of Europe did not materialise and seems unlikely in the near future. Although the Trump administration cast doubt on the credibility of NATO’s collective defence clause, announced withdrawals of troops have been limited. The decision to pull back 800 troops from Romania fits a long-term pattern rather than a strategic break: since the end of the Cold War, Europe is no longer the central theatre of American power. US troop levels fell from roughly 300,000 at the end of the Cold War to 63,000 in 2013, before increasing again after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine (Haas and Haesebrouck, 2025). Current troop levels are around 80,000, well above their post–Cold War low. Moreover, at the end of 2025, Congress adopted a bipartisan bill preventing reductions below 76,000 without allied consultation and an assessment of its impact. Although not an ironclad guarantee, these provisions demonstrate that there is no widely accepted desire in Washington for a US withdrawal in the short term.

This enduring US military presence reflects continued American interests in Europe. US bases and access to European airspace and waters remain essential to Washington’s global posture. Europe is also a vital economic partner and an important market for the American defence industry. Even the National Security Strategy, despite its controversial passages, acknowledges that Europe remains “strategically and culturally vital” to the US. While the administration attaches less value to NATO than its predecessors, it would not dismantle the alliance without cause. This ambivalence was underscored by two recent statements from Trump. In a Truth Social post he questioned whether NATO would “be there for us” while insisting that the United States would “always be there for NATO” (Giordano, 2026). One day later, he suggested that the United States might have to choose between preserving NATO and his longstanding interest in acquiring Greenland, implying that this ambition could constitute such a cause for a break with NATO (Sanger et al., 2026).

On Ukraine, the worst-case scenario of a complete halt in US support has also been avoided. Although Washington has not supplied new weapons, the PURL initiative enables Europeans to procure American equipment for Ukraine. Intelligence sharing was only briefly paused in early March and was restored within days. Precisely during that period, Russian troops gained more ground, including in the Kursk region, indicating how critical US intelligence sharing is for Kyiv’s battlefield performance. The administration has not decisively shifted toward Moscow’s position. At times Washington leaned in that direction, for instance after the controversial Zelenskiy-Trump-Vance press conference, during Putin’s warm welcome to Alaska or when the twenty-eight-point peace plan was leaked, but European pressure helped pull the United States back toward a more balanced approach. The adoption of new sanctions in October 2025 and the January 2026 pledge of security guarantees, though not clear how credible or binding these are, contradict the notion of a full US retreat. The US seizure of a Russian oil tanker further indicates continued willingness to confront Moscow in specific domains.

Taken together, these developments constitute the “good”: Europe and Ukraine have avoided the most damaging outcomes. However, while strong material incentives reduce the likelihood of a complete US pullback from Europe, Ukraine’s situation is far less secure. The Trump administration’s movement between European and Russian positions may not reflect genuine support for Ukraine, but rather be caused by Putin’s maximalist demands and refusal to compromise, which made meaningful progress toward a peace agreement impossible. This underlines the fragility of US commitment to Ukraine, fragility that points directly to the first element of the “bad”.

The Bad

If the avoidance of a worst case scenario in Ukraine offers some reassurance, it also draws attention to a deeply problematic development: the disappearance of genuine and reliable American support for Kyiv. Under President Biden, Washington clearly backed Ukraine, imposed strong sanctions on Russia, and provided extensive military aid. Under Trump, the United States has signed no new aid packages. While European states were able to replace American military support during the first months of the Trump presidency, they failed to sustain these efforts after the summer of 2025, leaving military aid to Ukraine between July and November at its lowest point since the beginning of the war (Trebesch & Nishikawa, 2025).

Even more troubling is the extent to which the US position shifted toward the Russian one. Presenting itself as a “neutral broker”, it frequently signalled openness to nearly all Russian demands. The overriding US objective appears focused on ending the war quickly to revive economic ties with Russia. According to reporting in the Wall Street Journal, members of the administration have already explored joint commercial projects with Russia for the postwar period (Hinshaw et al., 2025). The same economic motive was evident in the leaked twenty-eight-point plan, which proposed funnelling €86 billion in frozen Russian assets into US-led reconstruction efforts, with the United States taking half the profits. The National Security Strategy reflects this shift towards Russia. It does not describe Russia as an adversary, implies that European governments are prolonging the war, and offers no comparable commitment to defending Europe as it does to deterring conflict over Taiwan. Its assertion that “the outsized influence of larger, richer, and stronger nations is a timeless truth of international relations” even hints at acceptance of a Russian sphere of influence, much as the military operation to remove Maduro in Venezuela was justified by the notion that great powers are entitled to dominate their weaker neighbours.

The erosion of US support for Ukraine is a vital problem. Europe’s security depends directly on the outcome of the war. A favourable settlement for Moscow would embolden its imperial ambitions. Russia is rapidly rebuilding its military, for example by producing roughly 150 tanks a month and generating surplus loitering munitions and drones for export, and it will represent an even greater threat when no longer bogged down in Ukraine. In this context, Europe’s efforts might remain inadequate: even the €800 billion allocated under Readiness 2030, at current levels of cost efficiency, could fall short of what is required to meet this challenge (Burilkov et al., 2025). Europe’s future in deterring Russia depends on including Ukraine as a vital partner. Europe must therefore use all available leverage, including control of sanctions and frozen assets, to prevent an outcome that strongly undermines Ukraine’s capability.

A second “bad” for Europe is that its security dependence on the US has become a pressure point in other policy areas. During the trade disputes following Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariffs, several European states avoided taking a hard line because of concerns that Washington might retaliate by cutting off arms supplies to Ukraine, withdrawing troops from Europe, or even abandoning NATO (Bounds et al., 2025). Similar dynamics may emerge in the dispute over Greenland (Haesebrouck, 2026). Copenhagen’s declaration that American military action there would spell the end of NATO overlooked the fact that dissolving the alliance would harm Europe far more than the United States, and would certainly not bring Greenland back under Danish control. This asymmetric dependence was underscored when Trump declined to answer directly whether his higher priority was obtaining Greenland or preserving NATO, remarking only that “it may be a choice”, while also insisting that NATO was essentially useless without the United States (Sanger et al., 2026).

Using security dependence as a bargaining tool represents a fundamental escalation in how Washington exploits asymmetry. This shift poses a direct threat to Europe’s vital interests and magnifies the urgency of reducing long-term dependence.

The Ugly

Next to the good and the bad, many developments of the past year fall into the “ugly” category: events that were highly visible and troubling, but did not touch upon Europe’s vital interests and should therefore not receive disproportionate attention.

The most notable example concerns the passages in the US National Security Strategy referring to Europe’s alleged “civilisational erasure”, the supposed problems of European democracy and formulations that echo themes associated with the racist Great Replacement conspiracy theory. Such rhetoric is so strongly disconnected from European political realities that it is unlikely to have major practical consequences.

More concerning, though still of limited strategic significance, is the administration’s interference in European politics. J.D. Vance’s meeting with AfD leaders shortly before Germany’s elections, and Secretary Kristi Noem’s call for Polish voters to support the conservative presidential candidate, illustrate the challenge. European states should strengthen their democratic resilience, but in an era of hybrid influence such measures are necessary regardless of US behaviour. Moreover, Trump’s unpopularity limits the political usefulness of explicit endorsements. The administration’s dismissive and often hostile language about Europe has made Trump deeply unpopular across the continent. A poll conducted after the publication of the National Security Strategy showed that only small minorities of French, German, and British voters held favourable views of Trump (Cokelaere, 2025). Even among supporters of Germany’s AfD and France’s National Rally, negative views outweighed positive ones. Only among Reform UK voters did favourable views exceed unfavourable ones (48 percent versus 32 percent).

Another ugly development consists of the attempts at flattery by European leaders to persuade Trump to adopt a more positive view of Europe and not to act against European interests. The most prominent example was the NATO summit in The Hague, where European officials praised Trump to avoid political confrontations and keep the US engaged in the alliance. While the NATO Secretary General’s referring to Trump as “daddy” was perhaps a step too far, a 24 hours display of flattery may be a reasonable price to pay for continued US engagement in Europe.

Preserving the good, pushing back the bad, and ignoring the ugly

Trump’s first year back in office has not been great for Europe. Yet it is essential not to focus solely on the bad, but also to recognise what remains vital to preserve. In this context, the fact that Washington has not abandoned Europe, and has not fully shifted toward Russia on Ukraine, should be regarded as good news. Calling for forceful countermeasures may sound resolute, but risks undermining the “good” and, hereby, the very security Europe seeks to protect.

At the same time, the “bad” cannot be ignored. Ukraine remains vulnerable to being “sold out”, and Europe’s dependence enables US leverage in trade disputes and limits options regarding Greenland. The long-term solution is clear: Europe must strengthen its military capabilities and reduce its vulnerability to US pressure.

In the meantime, a United States president who appears to care more about transactional gains than about Ukraine and Europe, and who is willing to impose his will on allies, can inflict significant damage. In the short term, Europe must therefore use the leverage it still possesses and find strategies to oppose Trump while preserving the Article Five guarantee. Given that Ukraine’s security is a vital European interest, European governments must use every tool at their disposal to influence any eventual peace settlement, starting with preserving a structural, financial and military aid flow to Ukraine. On Ukraine, Trump cannot unilaterally end European sanctions or release frozen Russian assets held in Europe. Europe must also find ways to avoid being subjected to outright blackmail by the United States. It can draw on American dependencies on Europe, such as the importance of access to European bases. It can also employ strategies of soft balancing, for instance by building diplomatic support for the norm of territorial integrity, thereby increasing the costs of any potential American land grab while avoiding direct confrontation (Haesebrouck, 2026).

Lastly, European leaders must remain clear-headed and distinguish the “ugly” from the “bad”. Shocking passages in a security strategy or counterproductive support for radical right parties are not worth jeopardising the credibility of Article Five. Flattering a president who is openly dismissive of European democracy is certainly ugly. However, although such reputational damage strengthens the long-term case for greater European autonomy, in the short term the security of Ukraine and Europe is more important.

In the coming period, it will be vital for Europe to preserve the good, push back the bad, and ignore the ugly.

References

Bounds, A., Foy, H., & Hall, B. (2025, July 27). How the EU succumbed to Trump’s tariff steamroller. Financial Times.

Burilkov, A., Bushnell, K., Mejino-López, J., Morgan, T., & Wolff, G. B. (2025, June). Fit for war by 2030? European rearmament efforts vis-à-vis Russia (Kiel Report No. 3). Kiel Institute for the World Economy.

Cokelaere, H. (2025, December 29). Trump is unpopular in Europe — even among right-wing populist supporters. Politico Europe

Giordano, E. (2026, January 7). US–Donald Trump–NATO allies–Greenland: Crisis deepens. Politico Europe.

Haas, M., & Haesebrouck, T. (2025). Don’t wait for Washington: Time for a European plan for US retrenchment. In P. Diamond & A. Skrzypek (Eds.), The Great Unravelling (pp. 219–235). Foundation for European Progressive Studies.

Haesebrouck, T. (2026, January 9). Navigating the Greenland crisis: Europe’s imperfect but viable options (Egmont Commentary). Egmont Institute.

Hinshaw, D., Faucon, B., Ballhaus, R., Grove, T., & Parkinson, J. (2025, November 28). Make money, not war: Trump’s real plan for peace in Ukraine. The Wall Street Journal

Sanger, D. E., Pager, T., Rogers, K., & Kanno-Youngs, Z. (2026, January 8). “I don’t need international law”: Trump says power limited only by his morality. The New York Times.

Trebesch, C., & Nishikawa, T. (2025, December 10). Ukraine Support Tracker: Europe fails to offset US aid drop. Kiel Institute for the World Economy.