It Takes Four to Tango: Why Trump's Disregard for Ukraine and Europe Forecloses Just and Sustainable Peace

By Servaas Taghon and Fabienne Bossuyt

Servaas Taghon is a teaching assistant with the Ghent Institute for International and European Studies (GIES).

Prof. Dr. Fabienne Bossuyt is a professor with the Ghent Institute for International and European Studies (GIES).

This paper argues that any peace deal for Ukraine proposed by President Donald Trump should be treated with caution, as it risks producing an unjust and unsustainable settlement that could further destabilise European security. Trump’s approach prioritises rapid deals and improved relations with Russia over Ukraine’s existential needs and justice claims for Russian aggression. Since Trump’s return to office, U.S. policy has increasingly marginalised Ukraine while favouring Moscow, reflecting a broader shift away from the rules-based international order towards spheres of influence. European partners, sidelined by the U.S., while internally divided and militarily constrained, are unable to counterbalance this approach, further undermining prospects for durable peace.

Introduction

With the advent of the second Trump Administration, the meaning of the term peace is rapidly being hollowed out. President Donald Trump would even have us believe that rewarding the aggressor, while disregarding the defending party could hold the key to lasting peace. Trump most likely does not believe this himself, as he maintains a transactional logic to peace. Having no interest in seeking peace that is rooted in the international rules-based order, he favours pursuing short-sighted peace deals that come with lucrative economic and ideological gains. Of all peace negotiations that Trump has initiated since his return to the Oval Office in early 2025, the ones that are intended to end the war in Ukraine have arguably been the most striking. Whatever deal Trump envisions for Ukraine, it should be treated with utmost caution, because it is poised to bring peace that is neither just nor sustainable and could further destabilise European security.

Peace in Ukraine was one of the spearheads of Donald Trump’s election campaign. On numerous occasions during his campaign rallies, Trump famously stated that he would be able to stop the war within twenty-four hours. He repeated this when assuming office, yet without spelling out the terms on which a potential peace deal would succeed. His first step was to call Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president who had been diplomatically sidelined by the collective West since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022. This was followed by bilateral diplomatic talks in Saudi Arabia aimed at restoring U.S.-Russia relations, constituting a complete diversion from the hawkish line set out by the Biden Administration – and in fact from a decade of restraint in U.S. relations with Russia. As if this was just the beginning, the situation soon spiralled when Trump blamed Ukraine for starting the war and went so far as to call Zelensky a dictator, while praising Putin. U.S. policy hit rock bottom in front of the entire world when the U.S. President berated his Ukrainian counterpart for being ungrateful during a live-broadcast discussion in the Oval Office.

Over the course of the first year of the Trump 2.0. Administration, it is clear that the U.S. leadership is no longer aligned with Ukraine’s demands nor committed to holding Russia accountable for its aggression. Trump appears largely uninterested in Ukraine itself – perhaps with the exception of its mineral wealth and the economic gains of post-war reconstruction and loan repayment - and far more focused on restoring relations with Moscow. Be it because Russia is simply “bigger” in Trump’s words – and thus more important - or because of ideological affinity between the leaderships of both countries, the result is the same: Russia is prioritized and Ukraine is treated as a secondary actor in a war that it never sought.

This disinterest is paired with a profound lack of understanding of the region’s history, the nature of Russia’s ambitions, and the existential stakes for Ukraine. Consequently, the peace initiatives emerging from Washington are not designed to produce a just and sustainable settlement. Instead, they risk appeasing Putin and underestimating not only Russia’s goals in Ukraine, but also its broader revisionist aims. By ignoring Ukrainian grievances and agency, peace seems dead before it is even born.

At the same time, Ukraine’s European partners find themselves reduced to bystanders in Trump’s so-called peace initiatives, desperately attempting to soften the edges of Trump’s impulses towards a more constructive direction. The EU’s role, however, is not solely the outcome of deliberate exclusion by the U.S. It also reflects the EU’s own structural weaknesses: internal disunity, insufficient military capacity and an enduring reluctance to make sacrifices for Ukraine’s security. Together, these shortcomings further undermine the prospects for any sustainable peace and leave Europe as a whole underprepared for the consequences of a U.S.-Russia led ‘peace’ settlement.

Trump’s transactional approach to peace in Ukraine

Trump’s highway to peace fits within a broader ambition to be recognized as the “peace president.” Claiming to have brokered as much as eight peace deals, ‘peace-making’ is presented as one of the cornerstones of his foreign policy. However, underlying many of these initiatives lies a fundamentally transactional logic (Flint, 2025), geared toward quick, tangible outcomes rather than durable settlements. As a matter of fact, some of the settlements already appear to show cracks, shortly after they were concluded (Jeyaretnam, 2025). These peace settlements reflect a rushed approach and this often entails asymmetrical bargaining, as reflected also in Trump’s approach to the Russia-Ukraine war. Until now, Trump has aligned more closely with Russia’s proposed terms, leaving minimal room for Ukraine’s conditions for peace.

Academic research on conflict resolution and peace-building has identified multiple factors that shape the likelihood of sustainable peace, including the role of international law (Huth, Croco & Appel, 2011), the presence of democratic institutions and shared membership in intergovernmental organizations (Oneal, Russett & Berbaum, 2003), and the degree of internal and international support behind peace efforts (Mross, Fiedler & Grävingholt, 2022). Further research also stresses the importance of contextual factors -historical, political, social and military- in shaping prospects for settlement (Brosché & Duursma, 2018; Federer et al, 2025). Against this backdrop, neglecting the root causes of the conflict or imposing asymmetrical settlements are well-established barriers to durable peace.

Trump’s proposals for ending the Russia-Ukraine war contain precisely such structural obstacles, as they ignore the root causes of the war and pressurise the defending party into making disproportionate concessions to an aggressor who would be rewarded for violating international law. Four years into the full-scale war, Russia persists in its maximalist claims on different parts of Ukrainian territory, including Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Crimea. Alongside these territorial claims, the Kremlin demands the Ukrainian armed forces to be constrained in size and capabilities. For Ukraine, these positions are non-negotiable, constituting red lines tied to sovereignty, security and national identity. Moreover, while Kyiv demands solid external security guarantees to be included in the peace deal, which only European countries seem ready to offer, Moscow has repeatedly stated that it cannot accept any European troops on Ukrainian soil. Neither Moscow nor Kyiv have any intention to diverge from these positions, making it very unlikely that both parties are able to bridge their differences. The entrenched divergence echoes the failures of the Minsk I and II agreements of 2014-15, where international mediators attempted to reconcile incompatible positions amid Russia’s destabilization of eastern Ukraine (Haesebrouck & Taghon, 2022).

The Minsk process highlights several recurring structural problems. First, Russia’s persistent denial of involvement in the fighting in Donetsk and Luhansk illustrates Moscow’s attempt to frame the conflict as an internal Ukrainian crisis, thereby refusing being recognised as a party to negotiations (Åtland, 2024). This alone undermined the foundations of any meaningful settlement and also reflected the cynical environment in which the negotiations took place. Second, the agreements themselves stood out for their ambiguous and vague language, enabling divergent interpretations and non-compliance (Åtland, 2020). Third, the agreements lacked commitment of the parties involved, as well as external security guarantees (D’Anieri, 2023). Ultimately, the unresolved grievances and open-ended expectations embedded in the Minsk Agreements contributed to renewed escalation in 2022, demonstrating the diplomatic challenge in bringing Russia and Ukraine closer to agreement.

Up until this point, Trump’s envisioned peace initiatives do not address these long-standing structural issues. In fact, beyond the risk of amplifying the flaws of previous failed settlements and thus foreclosing any sustainable peace, they also reflect a complete disinterest in just peace. Particularly worrying are the signals emerging from Trump’s inner circle, exemplified by the appointment of real estate developer Steven Witkof as ‘special envoy’, despite his limited knowledge of the causes and context of the war (Politico, 2025). The choice for Witkoff is symptomatic of a broader Russia-leaning orientation within Washington’s new approach. Since Trump’s return to office, the pressure has almost entirely been shifted towards Ukraine. Beyond personal attacks directed at President Zelensky, Trump holds little sympathy for the Ukrainian cause in general (Kaarbo, Opperman & Beasley, 2023) and considers Russia’s might as an insurmountable challenge for the Ukrainians. His stated interest in restoring economic ties with Russia further reinforces this bias. Moreover, it has become increasingly apparent that Trump is intent on spreading illiberalism, which makes him more attached to the authoritarian model advocated by the Kremlin than the democratic ideals pursued by Ukraine.

In addition, the Russian bias reflected in Trump’s peace proposals should also be understood in view of Trump’s ambition to shift away from a rules-based international order toward a world divided into distinct spheres of influence. This means that Trump accepts Russia’s self-proclaimed right to a sphere of influence in the former Soviet space. It is unclear whether Trump and his advisers are fully aware of the scale of Russia’s broader imperial and revisionist ambitions, which extend beyond Ukraine and predate the 2014 annexation of Crimea (Bossuyt, Amoris & Riabchuk 2024). However, what they clearly underestimate is that appeasing Russia risks reinforcing or even aggravating instability in the broader region rather than resolving it.

The question of Ukrainian agency

Any just and sustainable peace settlement in the Russo-Ukrainian war hinges on the participation and consent of Ukraine. This is, first of all, a moral argument, because Ukraine is the primary victim of aggression. Secondly, this is also because of how the nation’s historical experience vis-à-vis Moscow has shaped Ukraine’s understanding of Russia’s intentions, which has resulted in a feeling of existential threat (Bossuyt et al., 2024). An imposed asymmetrical peace settlement – as reflected in Trump’s approach – would lead to decades of unresolved trauma and grievances among Ukrainians, and sustained feelings of deep hatred and distrust towards Russia, fueling prolonged instability and paving the way to an explosive political situation. Ukrainian outrage and sense of injustice would be further reinforced by the uncertain fate of their compatriots in the Russian-conquered Ukrainian territories, who under Russian occupation are currently already the victims of ethnic cleansing, forced Russification and systematic violence (Lewis, 2025).

From Kyiv’s perspective, the risks of appeasing Russia are self-evident and rooted in a long historical experience of domination (Bossuyt et al., 2024). Ukraine’s modern national identity has been shaped in opposition to successive periods of Russian rule, linking sovereignty and statehood to existential resistance (Knott, 2022).  Ukrainian statehood has been consistently denied by Russia and more blatantly so since the 2013-14 Maidan Revolution. In turn, the more Russia intensified pressure on Ukraine, the more Ukrainians consolidated the Euro-Atlantic vector and became antagonistic towards Moscow (Delcour & Wolczuk, 2015; Wilson, 2024). The Russian leadership became increasingly frustrated by this dynamic. Putin’s infamous essay of 2021, for example, denies Ukraine’s distinctiveness, confirming that Russian ambitions are not limited to territory, but extend to the question of Ukrainian nationhood in itself (Putin, 2021).

Russia’s full-scale invasion accelerated these trends, as Ukrainians have become more self-aware of their national identity and have identified themselves more in opposition to Russia (Wilson, 2024; Bossuyt et al., 2024). The framing of fighting for freedom and self-determination provides a strong incentive for Ukrainians to fight (Kudlenko, 2023). War can accelerate nation-building processes and the constitution of identity, not only presently but also in the mythologization of the nation over time (Wilson, 2024). Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has further entrenched the sense that Ukraine’s survival depends on resisting Russian control (Bossuyt, et al., 2024). The territorial concessions demanded by Moscow, and backed by the Trump administration, are therefore not merely strategic losses, but are existential threats to Ukraine’s statehood.

This background is important to understand Ukraine’s negotiating positions. Ceding territory is not only incompatible with Ukraine’s selfhood as a nation, but it also provides an existential security risk. Kyiv fears that Russia would quickly violate such a peace agreement once the opportunity presents itself. Provisional conditions in U.S.-Russia negotiations, such as constraining Ukraine’s military forces and imposed neutrality, further fuel Ukraine’s concerns of its material safety and its sovereign right to choose its alliances.

Trump’s transactional approach until now has disregarded Ukraine’s existential grievances. The EU remains firm in supporting Ukraine’s cause, with the notable exception of Hungary. Yet, the EU continues to be sidelined by the Trump Administration and is unable to offer the necessary security guarantees to Ukraine without U.S. backing, further weakening the prospects of a meaningful settlement.

Europe caught between dependency and unwillingness

While the transatlantic alliance long provided a solid anchor for Ukrainian interests in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Trump’s return to office has seriously challenged this status quo. In his envisioned road to peace, Trump has shown little consideration for the European partners, leaving them increasingly isolated in their support for Kyiv. This marginalization is symptomatic of a deeper rift that has been developing between the EU and the U.S. since Trump’s second term. The Trump Administration has not restricted its critique to Ukraine and Zelensky, but has repeatedly signalled that it does not regard the EU and its member countries as equal political actors.

Vice President J.D. Vance’s remarks at the Munich Security Conference clearly illustrated this attitude, as he reprimanded several European governments, while echoing discourse resembling that of radical-right movements. Trump himself recently labelled European leaders as “weak” and therefore inapt to end the war. The U.S. Security Strategy published in November 2025 further reinforces this ideological distance, speaking of a “civilizational erasure” on the European continent and lashing out at EU policies. The strategy further frames Europe’s approach to Russia as marked by a “lack of self-confidence” and suggests that European states fail to translate desire for peace into policy due to the “subversion of democratic processes.” Altogether, these statements point towards an ideologically driven rift between Washington and most European countries, reflecting two fundamentally different approaches on Ukraine.

Trump’s primary interest in restoring diplomatic and economic relations with Russia has placed the European allies in a compromised position. Ukraine remains heavily dependent on the U.S., while European security more broadly continues to rely on Washington’s military umbrella. This has resulted in a game of dependencies in which European countries avoid open confrontation with the Trump Administration, which in turn reinforces Europe’s exclusion from decision-making. As a result, European governments have been relegated to a largely reactive role, seeking to preserve U.S. engagement, while attempting to soften the most Russia-friendly elements of any U.S.-Russia negotiated peace proposal.

However, Europe’s marginalization cannot solely be explained as the outcome of U.S. exclusion, but is also explained by the inability of asserting itself as a prominent actor. As the war approaches its fifth year, European support for Ukraine remains substantial but increasingly fragile. In the summer of 2025, military aid to Ukraine from European countries declined significantly and failed to compensate for the gap left behind by the U.S. Furthermore, while the first half of 2025 did see a peak in military support, these were unevenly distributed across European countries (Kiel Institut, 2025). Europe’s waning support is illustrative of persistent divisions internally, even as most governments continue to align rhetorically.

The debate over the potential use of frozen Russian assets held by Euroclear, for instance, exposes a deeper reluctance among European allies to sustain the financial commitment to Ukraine. Despite four years of full-scale warfare on the European continent, there remains a lack of urgency in improving military preparedness and insufficient industrial capacity to adequately support Ukraine’s defence. In this context, being pushed into a marginal role by the Trump administration could even become a convenient justification for European inaction rather than a catalyst for strategic change.

Yet, the stakes for Europe in Ukraine’s future are considerable. For one, a Russia-friendly settlement, involving territorial concessions would leave Russia morally, materially and politically strengthened. Under U.S. auspices, Moscow would likely be reintegrated into the global economy with sanctions being relieved, reversing the economic pressure that has been applied on Russia since 2022. Such an outcome would increase Russia’s capacity and determination to pursue its broader regional ambitions. The existing military threat, particularly in Eastern Europe, would multiply at a moment in which Europe is not ready to defend itself. Even beyond conventional military risks, a strengthened Russia would likely intensify hybrid operations targeting already vulnerable democratic institutions across Europe. In this sense, the long-term costs of guaranteeing European security after a Russia-favoured settlement would far exceed the current costs of supporting Ukraine’s defence (Litra, 2025).

Next to these material challenges, European countries and the EU also face moral stakes. A peace settlement in which Ukraine is compelled to submit to aggression, in clear violation of international law, would undermine the EU’s credibility as a defender of the rules-based international order. Such an outcome would expose Brussels as politically weak and morally inconsistent and endanger its political objectives regionally and globally. Both Russia and the U.S. under Trump challenge the principles on which the liberal order is built, directly undermining European interests. This divergence only underlines the urgency of a stronger and more unified European voice in shaping any peace process concerning Ukraine.

Conclusion

Donald Trump’s return to the world stage has fundamentally disrupted the status quo in Russia’s entrenched war against Ukraine. In contrast to Biden’s sustained support for Ukraine, the Trump administration has openly questioned assisting Ukraine and isolating Russia. Washington sees no upside in a protracted war and is under the impression that Ukraine lacks the capacity to come out victorious. Instead, the U.S.’ interests increasingly lie in economic and diplomatic reintegration of Russia. Adhering to a transactional logic, Trump prioritizes making ‘a deal’ rapidly over the conditions required for a durable peace.

Given the U.S.’ decisive leverage to either sustain or suspend Ukrainian resistance, Trump has repeatedly tightened the screws on Ukraine. Ukraine is framed less as a victim of aggression and more as an obstacle to peace, persisting in what Washington views as a losing struggle and thereby compromising U.S. interests. The current administration holds little interest in the Ukrainian perspective, nor is it concerned with any of the root causes of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

At the same time, Ukraine’s continued resistance and its refusal to accept far-reaching concessions complicate any effort to impose a rapid peace settlement. Kyiv’s powerful reaction to Russia’s aggression is historically rooted and its antagonism towards Moscow has multiplied in recent years. Russia’s invasion has further cemented Ukraine’s selfhood in opposition to Russian domination and in alignment with the EU. Subsequently, both Russia’s ambitions towards Ukraine and Ukraine’s determination to oppose them, along with Trump’s interest in favouring Russia over Ukraine, are structural obstacles in achieving durable peace.

Finally, and strikingly, Europe and the EU have been relegated to play second fiddle in a war on their own continent. Trump and his entourage have consistently sidelined their European counterparts in peace negotiations, reflecting a broader ideological rift within the transatlantic relationship. Caught in a dependency trap, European leaders have to navigate Ukrainian interests without alienating Trump. Meanwhile, Europe remains unable to fill in the gap left behind by the U.S. in assisting Ukraine. A lack of urgency, internal divisions and insufficient military preparedness have constrained European action as much as U.S. exclusion has. The stakes for Europe and the EU in these peace negotiations, however, remain high. One year into Trump’s second term, it has become increasingly clear that a peace settlement negotiated primarily by the U.S. and Russia would undermine not only Ukraine’s sovereignty, but also Europe’s long-term security and the broader rules-based international order. Rather than achieving a just and sustainable peace agreement, Trump’s hastened approach risks further destabilising Europe’s Eastern flank, leaving Ukraine exposed and Europe weakened.

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