Once More, With Feeling: US Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement

By Hermine Van Coppenolle

Dr. Hermine Van Coppenolle is a postdoctoral researcher with the Ghent Institute for International and European Studies (GIES).

One of Donald Trump’s first acts in his second US presidency was withdrawing from the 2015 Paris Agreement. The US has historically played the role of 'rulemaker’ yet is notoriously fickle in its ratification and participation. This paper highlights this history of (non-)cooperation, how this second withdrawal differs from the first, and what the potential consequences, both good and bad, are for global climate governance. It shows how US withdrawal may not lead to a crippled regime but can rather pave the way to a more robust and engaged Paris Agreement.

‘I was elected to represent the citizens of Pittsburgh, not Paris’ (The White House, 2017). This is how Donald J. Trump justified his withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on the 1st of June, 2017. To date, the United States, the world’s largest historical polluter, is the only country that has withdrawn from the Agreement, not to mention the only one to have done it twice (Evans, 2026). These withdrawals were not made equal, however, and the learnings from the first may not translate to our current geopolitical era of uncertainty.

This time is serious. Not in the least since Trump has since followed with the withdrawal from both the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change), the Green Climate Fund, and the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) (Trump, 2026). This paper reflects on the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement in three parts. First, there is a discussion of the role that the United Sates has played in global climate governance since its inception. Second, the 2017 announcement is compared to the one in 2025. Finally, there is a discussion of possible consequences of the withdrawal.

The Role of the US in Global Climate Governance

This section zooms in on the role the United States has played in global climate governance, namely the UNFCCC and its two agreements: the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement. Looking at global governance in general, the United States is known to play a major role in treaty negotiations though they have an overall ratification deficit (Milewicz & Snidal, 2016). This dynamic is entirely recognisable when it comes to global climate governance: US preferences often shape climate agreements, yet there is non-cooperation whenever domestic politics shift.

The 1992 UNFCCC

The UNFCCC was negotiated under the tenure of George H.W. Bush (1989-1993). During this time, there was large international pressure and momentum to act on climate change. Human-induced climate change had been officially recognised by the United Nations General Assembly in 1988 (United Nations General Assembly, 1988). Following this, in 1990, an International Negotiation Committee was established to design a framework convention on climate change, which was due to be signed at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio (Bodansky, 1993).

The convention was widely seen as a disappointment, however (Bodansky, 1993). On one hand, it was praised on the merit of all negotiating countries coming to an agreement in the first place, as well as for containing the goal to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations to prevent human-induced climate change. On the other hand, the goal remained largely qualitative, rather than quantitative. There was no consensus on what this stabilisation entails, nor what countries were expected to do to achieve it. This lack of detail reflected the negotiation position of the United States at that time: the key points of contention were targets and timetables, climate finance, and access to technology for non-commercial purposes (Nitze, 1994). 

The 1997 Kyoto Protocol

Where the UNFCCC was negotiated by a reluctant Bush administration, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol saw a highly motivated and ambitious US delegation. Bill Clinton (1993-2001) and in particular his vice president Al Gore were intent on reaching a successful climate agreement (Hovi et al., 2012). Similarly to the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol also reflects some of the preferences of the US. The flexibility mechanisms introduced in the Kyoto Protocol such as emissions trading through the Clean Development Mechanism and joint implementation were there largely due to US demands (Bang & Schreurs, 2017).

However, despite the role the United States played in the negotiations, Clinton not only failed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, but his successor George W. Bush withdrew the US entirely in 2001. During the Kyoto negotiations, it became clear that an ambitious agreement with set targets and timetables – the ultimate outcome of the negotiations – would be impossible to get through the US Senate. Mere months before negotiations took place, it unanimously passed the Byrd-Hagel resolution stating it would not pass any treaty with emission reduction targets for developed countries (so-called Annex-1 countries in the UNFCCC) without commitments for developing countries as well. US participation in the Kyoto Protocol was dead in the water, with the Clinton administration failing to mitigate an uncooperative senate (Hovi et al., 2012).

The 2015 Paris Agreement

Barack Obama came into office with the campaign goal of acting on climate change (Parker & Karlsson, 2018). To this end, his administration played a pivotal role in the conception of the 2015 Paris Agreement. They forged a credible foundation for the agreement through joint declarations with China in 2014 and 2015, asserting that both countries were committed to successful negotiations in Paris (White House, 2014, 2015). They also played an important role in the exceptionally fast ratification of the agreement, according to former US Special Envoy for Climate Change Todd Stern (2018).

Though Obama’s administration was crucial for making the agreement happen, the United States also lies at the root of its weakening (Dimitrov et al., 2019). Expecting difficulties to reach a 2/3 majority in the Senate necessary to ratify International Treaties, particularly after the Kyoto Protocol experience, the Agreement was phrased so that Obama could argue that it imposed no binding legal obligations on the US. Instead, there are procedural requirements, relying on a pledge-and-review process: countries have to submit their own targets in a five-year cycle, which are then reviewed in a global stocktake (Falkner, 2016). This made it so the Agreement was ratifiable not via Congress, but rather through an executive decision.

Much ink has been spilled on the consequences of this softening, both from a legal, as well as a governance perspective (see for example Falkner, 2016; Hale, 2020; Rajamani, 2016). A discussion of this debate lies outside the scope of this paper. What is key, however, is that the flexibility Obama used to ratify the agreement also facilitated Trump’s withdrawals.  The Agreement’s flexible commitments paved the way for fickle US participation.

US withdrawal in 2017 compared to 2025

The United States thus has a history of shaping climate agreements that it fails to consistently cooperate with. However, the 2025 withdrawal is not a one-on-one copy of the 2017 announcement. The following section discusses the differences timing and international responses between the withdrawals.

The overall timing is a significant difference between 2017 and 2025. Due to a provision in the Paris Agreement, written notice to withdraw can only be submitted three years after the Agreement has gone into force (Paris Agreement, 2015, Article 28.1). This means that, whilst the US withdrawal was announced in 2017, Trump could only officially submit his notice of withdrawal in November of 2019. Consequently, it was not until November 2020 that it officially took place. By then, Joe Biden had been elected as president, and the decision was swiftly reversed when he took office in January 2021 (Blinken, 2021).

This second time, there will be no such delay: withdrawing from the Agreement was one of Trump’s first actions when entering office in January 2025 and it will officially take place on the 27th of January 2026 (Farand, 2025). At the very least, the US will be out of the Paris Agreement for the remainder of Trump’s term, which is due to end in 2029.

Aside from the timeline of the withdrawal, the political environment is also starkly different. To many, the 2016 election of Donald Trump was unexpected (Kennedy et al., 2018). On top of this, Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Agreement meant an absolute U-turn compared to his predecessor, who called the Agreement ‘the best possible shot to save the one planet we’ve got’ (Obama, 2016). The decision notably ran counter to public opinion, with surveys finding that almost 70% of US voters were in support of participating in the Paris Agreement (Friedhoff, 2023; Leiserowitz et al., 2017).

In response to this U-turn, the 2017 announcement was met with political outrage and counter-initiatives such as the ‘We Are Still In’-declaration and the coalition of Climate Mayors (BBC, 2017; Climate Mayors, 2017; We Are Still In, 2017). Whilst there were fears that US non-cooperation would result in other countries stepping out of the agreement, it instead resulted in a strengthening of the regime and its norms (von Allwörden, 2024).

In contrast, in 2024, it was already clear during his campaign that Trump would pull out of the Paris Agreement upon re-election (Lefebvre & Colman, 2024). Similarly to 2017, the 2025 announcement was condemned by world leaders and met with reiterated commitments from scientists and non-state actors (C40 Cities, 2025; Cleetus, 2025; Harvey, 2025). However, the past years have also seen increased pushback on climate norms such as net-zero and numerous corporate rollbacks of climate targets such as by BP, Shell, and Equinor (Net Zero Tracker, 2025).

Time will tell if the climate regime is as durable now as it proved to be in the wake of 2017, though Trump’s opposition to multilateral climate policy today goes notably beyond his first term. After all, he has now also withdrawn from the UNFCCC and IPCC, though in practice, US participation in and funding of these institutions was already reduced to near nothing at the start of his presidency (Dunne et al., 2026).

Consequences for global climate governance

What does US withdrawal mean for global climate governance at large? The following section discusses two prominent risks associated with US non-cooperation in global climate governance: negative repercussions for climate finance and the potential snowball-effect of other countries following the US’ lead. It ends with a discussion of possible benefits of US non-cooperation.

A blow to climate finance

As largest economy in the world, the United States played a big role in regard to climate fi-nance. At COP21 in Copenhagen in 2009, a goal of providing 100 billion dollars for climate finance by 2020 was introduced, which was finally met by developing countries in 2022 (OECD, 2024). This 100 billion target was revised at COP29 in Baku. The ‘New Collective Quantified Financial Goal on Climate Finance’ calls to scale up financing from all sources to 1.3 trillion dollars annually, with developed countries mobilising at least 300 billion per year by 2035. (OECD, 2025). Trump has made it clear that under his tenure, the US shall not contribute to international climate finance.

The disinvestment of science and environmental organisations may have even larger consequences for climate action, however. The US has historically accounted for over 30% of direct financial contributions to the IPCC, contributions that ceased during Trump’s terms (Dunne et al., 2026). Already in the first six months of this term, the Union of Concerned Scientists identified 403 attacks on science (Minovi et al., 2025). The United States is important for climate change not only because of its economic weight and the size of its greenhouse gas emissions, but it also has a historical contribution to climate science (Bang & Schreurs, 2017). The disassembly of US climate science can thus lead to sizable ripples in the regime at large.  

Snowballing non-cooperation

For the Kyoto Protocol, US non-cooperation was a big blow to the regime. It took eight years for the Protocol to come into force in 2005 and Canada, previously seen as a supporter of international climate cooperation, withdrew from the agreement in 2011 before facing the consequences of failing to comply with its targets (Eckersley, 2007; Glenn & Otero, 2013).

The Paris Agreement, in comparison, proved to be more resilient in the wake of the US’ first withdrawal than its predecessor (von Allwörden, 2024). However, this does not mean that there is no dissent. Former Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott called for Australia to pull out of the agreement in 2018 (Murphy, 2018). Argentinian president Javier Milei has also said that he is considering withdrawing from the Paris Agreement (Buenos Aires Times, 2025). Whilst neither country have followed through, the risks of increased withdrawals from an agreement that was lauded for its widespread participation should not be underestimated (Tørstad, 2020).

Potential benefits

Whilst the loss of US climate finance and climate science is an undeniable setback for global climate action, from the perspective of global climate governance, there may still be some benefits to the exit of such an unpredictable and unreliable partner like the United States.

Arild Underdal spoke of the law of the least ambitious program: the idea that international co-operation tends to converge to the lowest common denominator (Underdal, 1980; Victor, 2006). The first section of this paper shows how it has notably left its impression on global cli-mate governance: from pulling the plug out of the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 to avoiding binding targets in the Paris Agreement. Climate Action Tracker deemed US climate contributions in September 2025 as ‘critically insufficient’, describing it as ‘the most aggressive, comprehensive, and consequential climate policy rollback’ it has ever analysed (Climate Action Tracker, 2025).

Having such an unconstructive party around the table could slow down or even undermine further negotiations. This has been the case for international efforts to cut greenhouse gas emissions from international shipping under the International Maritime Organization – an organisation that Trump notably has not withdrawn from (Schonhardt et al., 2025).

Additionally, the two withdrawals have proven the United States to be a fickle and untrustworthy partner. The increasing polarisation and partisanship of climate politics makes it so that US engagement is subject to whichever party delivers the president (Schulze, 2021). This undermines one of the key benefits of the Paris Agreement’s design, namely that its long-term targets and iterative target-setting procedure sets a long-term ‘direction of travel’ for both countries and non-state actors (Falkner, 2016). In these veins, arguments have even been made for a permanent US exit from the Paris Agreement (MacNeil, 2025).

Conclusion

Global climate governance has been shaped by US (non-)cooperation. As the world’s largest historical emitter and largest economy, the United States undoubtedly has a role to play in global climate action and global climate governance. However, the extent to which the US has left its mark on the regime, perhaps disproportionately so, is ground for re-evaluation.

Whilst it is clear that there is little hope for the extensive climate action that is needed to curb climate change under this second Trump term, there are no guarantees that the next administration will be different. This exit is an opportunity to see what an effective Paris Agreement without the United States can look like. The last thing to do, is to play a waiting game until another US president wants to play the lead on the stage of international climate governance.

Bibliography

Bang, G., & Schreurs, M. (2017). The United States: The challenge of global climate leadership in a politically divided state. In R. K. W. Wurzel, J. Connelly, & D. Liefferink (Eds), The European Union in International Climate Change Politics: Still Taking a Lead? (pp. 239–253). Routledge.

BBC. (2017, June 2). Trump climate deal pullout: The global reaction.

Blinken, A. J. (2021, February 19). The United States Officially Rejoins the Paris Agreement. United States Department of State.

Bodansky, D. (1993). The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary. Yale Journal of International Law.

Buenos Aires Times. (2025, February 6). Milei says he’s considering taking Argentina out of Paris Agreement. Buenos Aires Times.

C40 Cities. (2025, January 21). Global network of mayors react to President Trump withdrawing the US from the Paris Climate Agreement. C40 Cities.

Cleetus, R. (2025, January 20). President Trump Ignores Science, Makes Disgraceful Decision to Withdraw US from Paris Agreement. Union of Concerned Scientists.

Climate Action Tracker. (2025, September 22). USA. USA.

Climate Mayors. (2017, June 1). 407 US Climate Mayors commit to adopt, honor and uphold Paris Climate Agreement goals. Medium.

Dimitrov, R., Hovi, J., Sprinz, D. F., Sælen, H., & Underdal, A. (2019). Institutional and environmental effectiveness: Will the Paris Agreement work? WIREs Climate Change, 10(4).

Dunne, D., Lempriere, M., Dwyer, O., Gabbatiss, J., & McSweeney, R. (2026, January 9). Q&A: What Trump’s US exit from UNFCCC and IPCC could mean for climate action. Carbon Brief.

Eckersley, R. (2007). Ambushed: The Kyoto Protocol, the Bush Administration’s Climate Policy and the Erosion of Legitimacy. International Politics, 44(2), 306–324.

Evans, S. (2026, January 8). Analysis: World’s biggest historic polluter – the US – is pulling out of UN climate treaty. Carbon Brief.

Falkner, R. (2016). The Paris Agreement and the new logic of international climate politics. International Affairs, 92(5), 1107–1125.

Farand, C. (2025, March 11). Climate crisis: US exit from Paris Agreement deals blow to international cooperation. International Bar Association.

Friedhoff, K. (2023, January 11). Americans Broadly Favorable to Participating in International Agreements [Blog Post]. The Chicago Council on Global Affairs.

Glenn, J. M., & Otero, J. (2013). Canada and the Kyoto Protocol: An Aesop Fable. In E. J. Hollo, K. Kulovesi, & M. Mehling (Eds), Climate Change and the Law (pp. 489–507). Springer Netherlands.

Hale, T. (2020). Catalytic Cooperation. Global Environmental Politics, 20(4), 73–98.

Harvey, F. (2025, January 24). How the world has responded to Trump’s Paris climate agreement withdrawal. The Guardian.

Hovi, J., Sprinz, D. F., & Bang, G. (2012). Why the United States did not become a party to the Kyoto Protocol: German, Norwegian, and US perspectives. European Journal of International Relations, 18(1), 129–150.

Kennedy, C., Blumenthal, M., Clement, S., Clinton, J. D., Durand, C., Franklin, C., McGeeney, K., Miringoff, L., Olson, K., Rivers, D., Saad, L., Witt, G. E., & Wlezien, C. (2018). An Evaluation of the 2016 Election Polls in the United States. Public Opinion Quarterly, 82(1), 1–33.

Lefebvre, B., & Colman, Z. (2024, June 28). Trump would withdraw US from Paris climate treaty again, campaign says. POLITICO.

Leiserowitz, A., Maibach, E., Roser-Renouf, C., Rosenthal, S., & Cutler, M. (2017). By more than 5 to 1, voters say the U.S. should participate in the Paris Climate Agreement.

MacNeil, R. (2025). The case for a permanent US withdrawal from the Paris Accord. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 0(0), 1–8.

Milewicz, K. M., & Snidal, D. (2016). Cooperation by Treaty: The Role of Multilateral Powers. International Organization, 70(4), 823–844.

Minovi, D., Barbati-Dajches, J., Cleetus, R., & Ellickson, K. (2025, July 21). Science and Democracy Under Siege. Union of Concerned Scientists.

Murphy, K. (2018, July 3). Tony Abbott urges withdrawal from Paris agreement, despite signing Australia up as PM.

Net Zero Tracker. (2025). Net Zero Stocktake 2025. NewClimate Institute, Oxford Net Zero, Energy & Climate Intelligence Unit, Data-Driven EnviroLab.

Nitze, W. A. (1994). A Failure of Presidential Leadership. In I. M. Mintzer & J. A. Leonard (Eds), Negotiating Climate Change: The Inside Story of the Rio Convention. Cambridge University Press.

Obama, B. (2016). Remarks by the President on the Paris Agreement. Office of the Press Secretary.

OECD. (2024, May 29). Developed countries materially surpassed their USD 100 billion climate finance commitment in 2022. OECD.

OECD. (2025, October 30). Contributions to assessments of progress on mobilising and aligning finance with climate goals. OECD.

UNFCCC (2015, December 18). Paris Agreement

Parker, C. F., & Karlsson, C. (2018). The UN climate change negotiations and the role of the United States: Assessing American leadership from Copenhagen to Paris. Environmental Politics, 27(3), 519–540.

United Nations General Assembly (1988, December 6). Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind. No. A/RES/43/53.

Rajamani, L. (2016). The 2015 Paris Agreement: Interplay Between Hard, Soft and Non-Obligations. Journal of Environmental Law, 28(2), 337–358.

Schonhardt, S., Mathiesen, K., & Sapio, M. (2025, October 17). Trump sinks global shipping climate tax. POLITICO.

Schulze, K. (2021). Policy Characteristics, Electoral Cycles, and the Partisan Politics of Climate Change. Global Environmental Politics, 21(2), 44–72.

Stern, T. (2018). The Paris Agreement and its future (Cross-Brookings Initiative on Energy and Climate). Brookings Institute.

The White House. (2017, June 1). Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord.

Tørstad, V. H. (2020). Participation, ambition and compliance: Can the Paris Agreement solve the effectiveness trilemma? Environmental Politics, 29(5), 761–780.

Trump, D. J. (2026, January 7). Withdrawing the United States from International Organizations, Conventions, and Treaties that Are Contrary to the Interests of the United States. The White House.

Underdal, A. (1980). Politics of International Fisheries Management: The Case of the Northeast Atlantic. Universitetsforlaget.

Victor, D. G. (2006). Toward effective international cooperation on climate change: Numbers, interests and institutions. Global Environmental Politics, 6(3).

von Allwörden, L. (2024). When contestation legitimizes: The norm of climate change action and the US contesting the Paris Agreement. International Relations.

We Are Still In. (2017)

White House. (2014, November 12). U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change.

White House. (2015, November 25). U.S.-China Joint Presidential Statement on Climate Change.