This Is Trump's NATO, and We Are Living in It
By Berk Vindevogel
Berk Vindevogel is an affiliated researcher with the Ghent Institute for International and European Studies (GIES).
NATO has faced numerous threats throughout its rich history, yet the most acute in recent years seems to be the second Trump administration. NATO has reorganised itself; states have significantly increased their defence to please 'daddy' Trump, and leaders across the Alliance stand ready to compliment the President for... well, for anything. Yet NATO remains in crisis. This Occasional Paper maps how Trump has affected NATO, and how the Alliance must move forward. Concluding that inaction from the European states would effectively paralyse the Alliance for an indefinite period.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) faced numerous threats throughout its rich history; yet the most acute in modern times appears to be the second administration of United States President Donald J. Trump. NATO has reorganised itself; states have significantly increased their defence to please 'daddy' Trump, and leaders across the Alliance stand ready to compliment the President for... well, for anything. Yet nothing seems to really help, because the crises keep piling up. First, this paper maps how the Alliance has changed with the Second Trump administration. Simultaneously, the paper sheds light on issues that have pre-dated the comeback of Trump. Considering that Trump or someone with similar policies stays on for an indefinite period, the paper then focuses on how NATO can still function effectively.
NATO’s anticipatory anxiety
NATO heralds itself as a consensus-based Alliance, where 32 members each have an equal say in the Alliance’s decision-making procedures. This is the official policy, but since the Alliance was created in 1949, it has been clear that the United States (U.S.) is the primus inter pares. In absolute terms, the U.S. possesses an unmatched military capability, and its nuclear capabilities provide a necessary umbrella for Europe. A clear manifestation of this position is NATO’s enlargement to Eastern Europe, which was pushed by former President Bill Clinton. Another prominent example is the fact that Article 5 has only been used once in the Alliance's history, when the U.S. experienced the horrific 9/11 attacks. There are numerous other examples to be presented, but the argument remains the same. Whoever sits in the Oval Office essentially decides NATO’s direction (Davis, 2025; Rynning, 2024; Sloan, 2024).
Therefore, whenever there are presidential elections in the U.S., NATO’s capitals are eager to see who comes out as the victor. During the 2024 Presidential election, the mood differed vastly because of the possible re-election of President Trump. Allies still remember his first administration vividly, which instilled fears of his possible comeback. Jens Stoltenberg, in a recently published book reflecting on his tenure as secretary-general, writes at length about how difficult it was to protect Allied unity with President Trump (Stoltenberg & Madsen, 2025). This prospect even influenced the appointment of former Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte as secretary-general. The so-called ‘Trump whisperer’ would clear the air between Trump and other Allies with the intention of not jeopardising the Alliance’s mission of deterrence and defence. President Trump was already changing the Alliance, and he was not even re-elected.
When he eventually was re-elected, NATO’s international staff, and much of the delegations, wondered what this could mean for the Alliance. At NATO, discussions ran aground, and as reported by Politico, international staff pre-emptively reorganised itself so as not to jeopardise the climate change and gender agendas at NATO (Roussi, 2025). The Alliance prepared for the past Trump Administration.
Some of NATO’s issues predate Trump
The re-election of Trump brought change to the Alliance, but it has also highlighted two issues that were already present long before: disunity within the Alliance and the need for European states to carry a larger part of the burden. Because of the power of the U.S., most discussions at NATO have indeed been impacted more significantly. Still, it would be incorrect to state that these difficulties can only be attributed to the Trump Administration. It may be a hard truth, but let’s face it. NATO currently consists of 32 member states. For an Alliance that touches upon the most existential policy field, a country’s defence, and decides through consensus, 32 is too much. This leads to 32 national governments that have 32 different geographies, histories, and as such 32 different threat perceptions. After more than 76 years, conflicts are bound to happen, and they have. Türkiye and Greece have been at odds with each other regularly and were even in direct conflict with each other in 1974. Hungary and Slovakia have strayed away from the Alliance’s core values, hampering certain policy agendas, similar to their blockades in the European Union. These differences have now culminated with President Trump. A clear manifestation of this was the The Hague Summit Declaration in 2025, which consisted of only five paragraphs, whereas the Washington Declaration the year before contained over 38 extensive paragraphs that covered a much wider range of topics.
U.S. calls to Europe and Canada to invest more in its defence are not new either. These are frustrations that are as old as the Alliance itself. Europe has to do more, and Europeans knew this, but neglected this issue for too long. In light of the Russian illegal invasion of Ukraine, European states significantly increased their defence spending. After Trump’s re-election, the threat of total U.S. disengagement and the withdrawal of troops prompted Allies to agree to 5% as the new benchmark for defence(-related) investments. To please President Trump, Secretary-General Rutte privately messaged Trump that “Europe is going to pay in a BIG way”, which was “his win”. Such rhetoric might be ugly, but it works (Haesebrouck & Haas, 2026).
But the current situation is definitely because of Trump
U.S. leadership is part of the Alliance, but it is clear that the U.S. is taking that role rather differently today. More specifically, this paper points towards three issues: the abrupt change in U.S. diplomacy, the lack of trust in their Article 5 commitments, and changes in their foreign policy priorities.
Previously, one could argue that the U.S. was more consultative in its approach to different regions or on various topics. Background conversations reveal that when something had to be decided on, for example, on the High North, it was expected that they would consult with policymakers from that region and decide on the best approach. Today, under President Trump, the U.S. behaves as if it were the only adult in the room, and the rest must simply follow. The U.S. no longer wants to lead by cooperation; it wants to dominate by aggression. They truly believe that this world is governed by power, meaning that the U.S. can do whatever it wants. In light of Trump’s statements regarding the annexation of Greenland, Stephen Miller, Trump’s deputy chief of staff for homeland security, stated on the record that “nobody is going to fight the United States over the future of Greenland” (Collinson, 2026). On NATO-enlargement, the national security strategy says that U.S. policy towards Europe should prioritise “ending the perception, and preventing the reality, of NATO as a perpetually expanding alliance”.
A by-product of this stance is their lack of tolerance for diverging opinions. In the main meeting room at NATO, where the North Atlantic Council meets regularly, there is a Latin quote written on the wall: “Animus in consulendo liber”, which translates to “A mind unfettered in deliberation”. It is the motto of NATO, but since Trump came back to power, it suffered a silent death. The U.S. displays oppressive tendencies in dealing with Allies who supposedly go against American interests. Allies who are not quick enough to congratulate the United States every step of the way might be hit with retribution.. The U.S. is the only state in NATO that can get away with this type of behaviour. Diplomats from the 31 other Allies, in doing the best they can for their country, are sure to follow along. This does not mean that there is no opposition at all. Especially in light of Trump’s statements concerning Greenland, Allies have backed Denmark all the way with a common statements and boots on the ground.
Second, the ‘America First’ strategy raises questions about their Article 5 commitments. Say that a NATO ally is attacked, who can guarantee that the U.S. will honour its Article 5 commitments? U.S. officials have privately and publicly stated that they remain committed to NATO and to Article 5, but those statements lack credibility because Trump has proven to act purely in his self-interest. The military operation in Venezuela serves as a case in point. In addition, President Trump is keen to follow an unpredictable foreign policy, which undermines the trust put in their commitments (Mcmanus, 2025). Furthermore, on several occasions, President Trump stated that “if NATO members don’t pay, I’m not going to defend them” (Hunnicutt & Brunsstrom, 2025). Or “I doubt NATO would be there for us if we really needed them”, which in a way pre-emptively legitimises U.S. inaction. Even if they answer to their commitment, there is considerable leeway in the interpretation of the support they can give, because the Article is very flexible.
Last, the United States repeatedly signals other priorities than Europe. More precisely, they refer to protecting their hemisphere and focusing on China (President Donald J. Trump, 2025). This is apparent in the Ukrainian peace negotiations. Instead of fostering a sustainable conclusion to the war in Ukraine, the U.S. delegation seems more concerned with getting this thing done so they can move on. A Trump administration with different geographic interests will not commit to Europe if they can’t see how it benefits them.
How can NATO exist under Trump?
One year of Trump 2.0 has heavily impacted the Alliance. NATO thrives under a cooperative United States, but it has seen anything but that since Trump came back. The situation is difficult, and the recent iteration of threats aimed at Greenland shows exactly how far the U.S. pendulum swings. Denmark, one of NATO’s most transatlantically oriented allies, now considers the U.S. as a security risk. Its Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, noted that “If the United States decides to militarily attack another NATO country, everything would stop” (Lund Nielsen, 2026). The atmosphere at NATO is tense. How can NATO face Russia or China when its most powerful member does not behave as an Ally? The U.S. is alienating Allies that have supported the United States on many occasions. Allies that have sent their soldiers to die in conflicts started by the United States. The current U.S. approach to NATO is not guided by careful strategic considerations. Rather, the Trump administration does what it feels necessary to immediately preserve American interests, without considering the long-term implications of its policies. They don’t have an endgame.
This paper raises many doubts that exist in capitals across the Alliance. Now what? Allies are still heavily dependent on the U.S., especially in terms of enablement and overall logistics (Bergmann & Svendsen, 2025). Europe must find a way to not only increase its defence spending, but also to plan for the defence of Europe without the United States. Facing the reality that the U.S. might not help us. I support statements to Europeanise NATO or create a ‘European pillar’ in NATO. Effectively, this would lead to a separate NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), which would not account for U.S. capabilities. To supplement NATO, states should use Trump’s term as a window of opportunity to regionalise their defences. Enhance or create auxiliary frameworks that supplement NATO. A case in point is Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), or the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF).
NATO’s framework nations, apart from the U.S., need to step up in their respective theatres. The Alliance is becoming dysfunctional with 32 Allies. Statements take way too long or are watered down heavily. Planning becomes increasingly difficult, and politically, some states have strayed away from the Alliance’s core values. If any state in NATO wants to feel safe, it should look towards its neighbours, and the framework nations first. NATO provides treaty-based tools to enhance regional cooperation, but it cannot be the sole forum for security any longer. What Europe must absolutely not do is hope that this will just pass. Counting down the days and hoping for the election of a pro-NATO candidate is no strategy.
The United States elected Trump twice to the presidency; it can elect someone with similar policies.
Conclusion
In 1995, Joe Biden, Senator at the time, stated “that Europe cannot stay united without the United States. There is no moral centre in Europe” (Biden, 1995). Today, U.S. leadership cannot be taken for granted. The second Trump administration shows that European dependence on the U.S. is not only a structural weakness but a strategic vulnerability that can be exploited. Europe should increase defence spending, start independent planning, and develop frameworks that can function independently of NATO. Europe must be able to defend itself, if necessary, alone.
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