Understanding Trump's Anti-Multilateralism and China's Reactions

By Dries Lesage

Prof. Dr. Dries Lesage is a professor with the Ghent Institute for International and European Studies (GIES). He is affiliated with Ghent University.

The paper offers a nuanced explanation of President Trump’s anti-multilateral policy. The latter defies predictions of neoliberal institutionalism by showing how ideas are crucial to understanding how U.S. administrations navigate geopolitical power shifts and global crises. The final paragraph looks into Chinese reactions. China is unable and unwilling to fill the leadership void in the multilateral system. It cooperates constructively and seeks to gain influence in the UN, but at the same time doubles down on its bilateral initiatives supported by multilateral fora – such as the Health Silk Road – to retain maximum control.

Introduction

In his second term, President Trump has turned even more forcefully against the multilateral system. In 2025, the U.S. withdrew from the World Health Organisation (WHO), the UN Human Rights Council, the UN Paris Climate Agreement, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). The winding down of USAID and deep cuts in U.S. financial contributions triggered budget crises across numerous UN development and humanitarian agencies (Dijkstra, 2025).

In January 2026, the U.S. left a further 66 “international organisations, conventions, and treaties deemed contrary to U.S. interests,” including the foundational United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (White House, 2026).

In this paper, we try to make sense of Trump’s disruptive multilateral strategy. In the final paragraph, we do the same for China’s reactions. 

Analytical framework

The anti-multilateral decisions cannot solely be attributed to Donald Trump’s personality. Presidential views are only one element in a broader analytical framework. Realist-inspired hegemonic stability theory (HST) argues that a strong multilateral order requires a hegemon able and willing to provide global public goods – such as an open trading system, a reserve currency, and security. It does so because it needs an open and stable world economy and has the resources to fund the required multilateral institutions (Kindleberger, 1981; Webb & Krasner, 1989).

When U.S. relative power appeared to decline from the 1970s onward to the advantage of Europe, Japan and China, some adherents of HST predicted the collapse of the U.S.-led multilateral system. Neoliberal institutionalists argued instead that shared interests under conditions of complex interdependence – later termed globalization – would sustain cooperation, even in the absence of a hegemon (Keohane, 1984).

As we will see, neither material dominance nor globalization automatically produces a pro-multilateral stance, however. Leaders’ and citizens’ interpretations of global issues and their ideas about international cooperation – their ‘social purpose’ – are decisive (Matthijs, 2022; Ruggie, 1982). These ideas evolve over time within U.S. politics and society.

One ideational constant, though, is ‘U.S. exceptionalism’: the belief that the U.S. uniquely embodies superior values such as individual liberty and the free market, and that its sovereignty must prevail. This mindset has shaped isolationist, unilateral, and multilateral policies alike, as the U.S. sees itself as “bound to lead” and not accountable to any institution above itself (Hughes, 2015; Patman & Southgate, 2016). It also explains, for example, why the U.S. has never ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, as the only country in the world.

Therefore we need a framework that integrates both structural factors and ideas. Presidents confront at least three key external variables. First, the nature and intensity of global challenges affecting U.S. interests and values. Second, U.S. geopolitical and economic power: hegemonic stability theory suggests that U.S. dominance and the self-confidence that goes with it, correlate with stronger multilateral engagement, and vice versa. Third, domestic opinion in society and Congress about global issues and global governance – which presidents can also influence themselves. Government departments such as the State Department or the Pentagon also contribute, though less decisively; therefore we will not consider this factor here.

These external factors interact with the president’s own convictions along the axes of isolationism-internationalism and unilateralism-multilateralism. Together, they shape White House decision-making and ultimately determine policy.

Historical overview of U.S. administrations and multilateralism

Let us apply the analytical framework to noteworthy historical examples, which will help us better understand Trump’s second administration.

Woodrow Wilson and the interwar years

In 1919, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson was firmly convinced of the need for a robust multilateral system to secure peace and international cooperation. Relying on America’s geopolitical leadership, he championed the creation of the League of Nations. Yet the U.S. was not overwhelmingly dominant geopolitically, and Congress remained staunchly isolationist. In 1920, it refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and thus rejected membership of the League (Ambrosius, 2017). The interwar period subsequently illustrated the ‘Kindleberger trap’: no great power was willing or able to assume sustained international leadership (Nye Jr, 2017).

The multilateral ‘big bang’ and the Cold War

U.S. geopolitical and financial-economic preponderance after WWII was far more pronounced than after WWI, and the trauma of WWII ran deeper. Democratic Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933-1945) and Harry S. Truman (1945-1953) operated in a more self-confident and internationalist atmosphere in U.S. society and politics. The state-interventionist spirit of the New Deal further facilitated a ‘big bang’ of multilateral institutionalisation: the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, the United Nations (including its specialized agencies), and the unprecedented General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (Patrick, 2008; Weiss, 2009).

The Cold War, which immediately followed, paralysed the UN in multiple ways, prompting a degree of U.S. disengagement. Yet, still consistent with hegemonic stability theory, the U.S. simultaneously invested in a parallel multilateral architecture for the capitalist world. Because communist countries refused to participate, the IMF and World Bank emerged as powerful Western bulwarks, alongside regional development banks dominated by major capitalist states. This Western-centred architecture also encompassed the multilateral Marshall Plan (1947), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO, 1949-1950), the International Organisation for Migration (IOM, 1951), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 1961), and the Group of Seven (G7, 1975).

The first post-Cold War decade

The U.S.’s overwhelming military and economic might, combined with the neoliberal and internationalist outlook of U.S. politics at the end of the Cold War, sparked renewed momentum for multilateralism in the early 1990s. Republican President George H. W. Bush (1989-1993) proclaimed a ‘New World Order’ in which the UN would play a meaningful role. In 1990–1991, he secured a rare UN Security Council mandate for a U.S.-led military intervention against Iraq to liberate Kuwait. The 1990s also saw a series of major UN conferences, beginning with the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, whose legacy persists today. Democratic President Bill Clinton (1993-2001), in turn, oversaw the successful conclusion of the Uruguay GATT negotiating round in 1994 and the creation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), later approving China’s accession in 1999.

Things began to shift in the mid-1990s. In 1993, when U.S. soldiers were killed during a UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia, members of Congress and the public increasingly questioned U.S. overseas commitments lacking clear national interest. In 1997, President Bill Clinton chose not to submit the Kyoto Protocol against climate change to Congress, anticipating defeat (Luck, 1999).

The George W. Bush administration

The Republican administration of George W. Bush (2001-2009) represented a turning point in U.S. engagement with multilateralism. Ideology played a crucial role in this: Bush and his team were neoconservatives, sceptical of international law and multilateral frameworks. Unlike Trump, the Bush administration remained largely internationalist, though disengaged from UN-centred multilateralism. It withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and famously ‘unsigned’ the Kyoto Protocol, partly because emerging powers like China were exempt from emission targets.

Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the U.S. led a massive UN- and NATO-backed military operation in Afghanistan, but unilaterally and illegally invaded Iraq in 2003. Economically, the administration supported the launch of the global Doha negotiating round in the WTO in 2001. Yet deepening multipolarity soon emerged, exemplified by a new coalition of China, India, Brazil, and other emerging economies in the WTO, which resisted Western demands. By 2015, the Doha Round had stalled in gridlock. In line with HST, the shift from unipolarity towards multipolarity became a complicating factor for multilateral cooperation.

The Obama and Biden administrations

As an internationalist and pro-multilateralist, confronted with the global financial and climate crises in a growingly multipolar world, Democratic President Obama (2009-2017) engaged rising powers through the new G20 summits and other forums. In 2014, ahead of the 2015 UN climate summit, he reached a deal with China’s President Xi Jinping, paving the way for the landmark Paris Climate Agreement.

Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia’ included negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a major trade and investment pact with Pacific economies excluding China. Obama also invested in new informal bodies of relevant states, such as the Nuclear Security Summits and the Clean Energy Ministerials – retaining maximum control for the U.S. This ‘multilateralism à la carte’ – still working with the UN but also decentring that institution – was Obama’s way to address global challenges in a multipolar world (Patrick, 2009). This approach was in line with neoliberal institutionalist predictions, but the president’s ideology was an equally important factor.  

After the first Trump administration (2017-2021), President Joe Biden (2021-2025) restored Obama-style multilateralism. He reversed U.S. withdrawals from multilateral institutions and recognized that climate, COVID-19, financial stability, and tax fairness required strong multilateralism. Accordingly, he supported G20/OECD efforts to implement effective taxation of multinational companies and the IMF’s $650 billion allocation of new special drawing rights. However, he did not resume TPP negotiations, as the U.S. public had grown wary of trade deals exposing domestic agriculture and industry to cheaper imports. Biden also maintained Trump’s high tariffs on China and, through massive public investments, violated WTO rules on subsidies. He continued Trump’s policy of blocking the appointment of new judges to the WTO Appellate Body, disabling the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism. 

The second Trump administration

Trump’s positioning along the axes of isolationism-internationalism and unilateralism-multilateralism is more complex than often portrayed. As a right-wing populist who has both shaped and aligned with his Republican base, Trump adopts an isolationist stance on many issues, seeking to keep import competition, immigration, and drugs out. Following the “America First” logic, he sharply reduces political, legal, and financial commitments to multilateral institutions and treaties. Ideas are central here: Trump basically rejects the idea of global challenges and crises requiring robust multilateral cooperation. In some cases, Team Trump questions the underlying science (climate, environment, health) or rejects perceived “woke” agendas (gender, LGBTQIA+). There is also a performative element: spectacular withdrawals from UN bodies reinforce his anti-globalist appeal. Hence, he defies the neoliberal institutionalist predictions of increased demand for cooperation in the face of multiple global challenges and crises.

Yet Trump does not fully close the U.S. off from the world. On trade, he is an outspoken mercantilist, as he expects foreign markets to remain open for U.S. exports. He seeks to enforce this through tariffs, and leverages other nations’ military dependence on the U.S. The tariffs – illegal under WTO law – demonstrate unilateralism, as do Washington’s threats toward BRICS countries considering de-dollarisation.

Trump’s anti-multilateralism does not always translate into full isolationism. In December 2025, after leaving the WHO, the State Department announced plans for multi-year bilateral agreements on global health cooperation with dozens of developing countries, even though funding details remain unspecified. Through bilateralism, the U.S. remains engaged internationally, while retaining maximum control.

Trump appears indifferent to China and others gaining influence in ‘the less important institutions’ he leaves. Yet, the U.S. remains in the WTO; thanks to its veto it can block the appointment of new judges to the Appellate Body, so that complainants against the U.S. can now only appeal in the void – this is a symbolic asset for the U.S. Similarly, Trump’s commitment to the IMF and World Bank reflects the power-multiplying effect of the U.S.’s unique veto in those institutions, allowing instrumentalisation for bilateral geopolitical interests (Heinkelmann-Wild, 2026).

Trump’s ambivalent approach is also evident at the UN. In September 2025, he praised the UN’s “tremendous potential” while simultaneously lambasting it. Yet the U.S. does not quit the UN, unlike Congress’s rejection of the League of Nations in 1920 or the fascist powers’ departure in the 1930s. Trump pulls back from that brink so far. To the contrary, in November 2025 Trump sought and received Security Council endorsement for his Gaza peace plan, including the Board of Peace and an International Stability Force. Impressed by their unusually united front, Trump repeatedly thanked the supporting Islamic countries, crucial for implementation. These countries also host key U.S. and Trump family business interests. Soft balancing against the U.S. appears to have at least some effect. Convening the G20 summit in Miami in December 2026 further signals a willingness to engage multilaterally in a multipolar world. Like presidents before him, Trump moderates after initially taking a radical anti- or pro-multilateralist stance early in office (Howard, 2010).

Trump’s relationship with NATO is similarly nuanced. His insistence on a 5 percent GDP target for defence spending may serve future European arms sales in the U.S. but also indicates continued organisational commitment. American Article 5 guarantees appear less certain but are not off the table. Complete U.S. withdrawal from NATO or its missions is not on the agenda either. In this multipolar world, the U.S. weighs carefully before abandoning key allies, mindful of potential new alignments.

China’s reactions to Trump’s anti-multilateral moves

China adjusts to President Trump’s moves in line with its established multipronged multilateral strategy. This strategy comprises active participation in, and the expansion of influence within, universal multilateral institutions; the creation or co-founding of parallel institutions; and bilateral initiatives supported by multilateral forums, notably the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

In his January 2017 address to the World Economic Forum in Davos, President Xi Jinping pushed back against Trump’s anti-globalism and anti-multilateralism, portraying China as a champion of economic openness and multilateral cooperation. He embraced globalisation and stressed the benefits of free trade (Chin, 2021; Xi, 2017). The speech could be interpreted as China stepping up to fill a leadership vacuum in the multilateral system.

The picture is more nuanced, however. China’s position cannot be compared to that of U.S. hegemony after WWII or after the Cold War. As a relative newcomer – the People’s Republic of China joined the UN in 1971, the Bretton Woods institutions in 1980, and the WTO in 2001 – it has faced an uphill struggle to gain influence in a Western-dominated multilateral system.

Today, China participates constructively in multiple multilateral institutions. From being a laggard, it has become more progressive on climate (Jiang, 2021; Wang & Rosenau, 2009). The EU and China have also pledged diplomatic cooperation in other multilateral negotiations, for example on the UN Plastics Treaty (Cater, 2025). In the WTO, China joined the EU in establishing the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) as an alternative to the defunct Appellate Body, allowing participating countries to adjudicate trade disputes (Hopewell, 2025). Beyond cooperation on specific global causes, China views a treaty-based, UN-centred system as a core interest because it provides stability, predictability, and respect for sovereignty – albeit with some Chinese hypocrisy, notably on the South China Sea, Ukraine and human rights law (Raustiala, 2025).

After Trump withdrew from the WHO for a second time in 2025, China did not simply assume leadership or multiply its financial contributions. In May 2025, it pledged an additional USD 500 million to the WHO over five years and sent 180 delegates to the World Health Assembly, signalling a desire for greater influence. But China understands it cannot dominate the institution outright, as illustrated by its dispute with the secretariat over the origins of COVID-19.

Instead, China doubles down on its own Health Silk Road (HSR) under the BRI. Launched in 2015, the HSR provides assistance and capacity-building to partner countries on various aspects of the health sector. It gained momentum during the COVID-19 pandemic, when China distributed masks and vaccines worldwide. The HSR offers opportunities for Chinese companies and research centres while amplifying soft power in the Global South and Central and Eastern Europe. Its multilateral dimension – including alliances and ministerial forums – enables China to retain political control, apply its own standards, and engage partners selectively in line with its geopolitical and economic agenda (Jones et al., 2026; Rolland, 2024; Wang, 2025; Wise, 2025).

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