

# GIES HONOURS PAPERS

Volume 1 | Academic year 2021-2022

## EXPLAINING THE VARYING ELECTORAL FORTUNES OF POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT PARTIES IN THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS - A FUZZY SET ANALYSIS

**Matthew Derycke**

Master International Politics – Ghent University<sup>a</sup>

Dissertation promotor: Prof. dr. Hendrik Vos

---

### Introduction

While a record number of members of populist radical right parties (PRRPs) secured a seat in the European Parliament during the 2019 European elections, there was a striking variation in the success of PRRPs across Europe. The far right indeed made striking gains in some European countries, such as Belgium and Italy, but in countries like Spain and the UK, the expected radical right surge turned out to be a mere ripple.<sup>1</sup> This article aims to explain the varying electoral fortunes of PRRPs in the old EU-member states (the states that joined the EU before the so-called big bang Eastern Enlargement of the 2000s). More specifically, it addresses the following research question: “why were populist radical right parties successful in some EU member states during the 2019 European elections and not in others?” Hereby, the study addresses an important gap in the

literature. Studies on the success of PRRPs in European elections are scarce. The most recent article on the issue has been published in 2007 and examines the 2004 elections.<sup>2</sup> Given that the political landscape in the EU has changed significantly in the last fifteen years, new research can lead to new insights. To address this gap in the literature, this contribution develops a theoretical framework that combines demand- and supply-driven explanations of radical right success, which is tested with fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). The result of this analysis shows that PRRPs were successful if people had negative attitudes towards migrants and if there was a high degree of Euroscepticism together with the absence of success of populist radical left parties (PRLPs).

This article is structured as follows. The first section defines PRRPs and introduces the

---

<sup>a</sup> In the GIES Honours Papers, students who wrote an exceptional master’s dissertation under the supervision of a member of the GIES get the opportunity to present their main argument or findings in a concise paper.

theoretical framework. Subsequently, the research design introduces the research method and discusses the operationalization and calibration of the outcome and the conditions. The third section presents the main results of the analysis, before the conclusions recapitulate the main argument and suggest pathways for future research.

### Explaining the success of populist radical right parties

This section defines PRRPs, after which it introduces five possible explanations for the success of PRRP's in the 2019 European elections.

In line with the ideational approach of Mudde<sup>3</sup>, **populism** is defined as "an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people."<sup>4</sup> **Radical right** parties, in turn, all have in common that they have an exclusionist and ethno-nationalistic description of citizenship. Moreover, they also consider non-native elements as a threat to the homogeneous nation-state.<sup>5</sup> This characteristic corresponds to the concept of nativism, which combines xenophobia and nationalism.<sup>6</sup> A last characteristic that all radical right parties have in common is authoritarianism.<sup>7</sup> Authoritarianism stands for a belief in a strongly monitored society, where a strong authority can punish severely. PRRPs are, thus, parties that share a core ideology that combines (at least) three features: nativism<sup>8</sup>, authoritarianism<sup>9</sup>, and populism.<sup>10</sup>

Prior literature suggests **several explanatory conditions** that can lead to the success of PRRPs, which can be divided in two groups: the demand side and the supply side.<sup>11</sup> These

conditions are derived from studies on the electoral success of PRRPs at the national level. Nevertheless, they can also be expected to be relevant at the European level, given that voters mainly look to the national level to cast their vote for the European elections.<sup>12</sup>

**Demand-side explanations** suggest that the success of PRRPs hinges on the grievances of the population.<sup>13</sup> We expect three kinds of grievances to result in successful PRRPs. The first kind is linked to the economic situation in a country.<sup>14</sup> More specifically, in line with Weisstanner and Engler<sup>15</sup>, we expect that people are more likely to vote for PRRPs if they have the feeling that they are strongly affected by income inequality. The second type of grievances is linked to migration: if people have the feeling that migrants have a negative impact on their country or life, then there is a bigger chance that people will vote for PRRPs.<sup>16</sup> The last grievance is linked to the EU. Research from Lubbers and Coenders showed that there is increasingly more resistance to further European integration and the European Union.<sup>17</sup> Their research also revealed that Euroscepticism is the third strongest socio-political explanation for the success of PRRPs.<sup>18</sup>

**Supply-side explanations** suggest that the success of PRRP's depends on whether they are perceived as being able to address the grievances of the population and whether they face competition from other anti-system parties. According to Kitschelt and McGann, the ideological success formula of PRRPs is based on exclusionistic positions together with pro-liberal market positions.<sup>19</sup> Later research, however, shows that the ideological success formula of PRRPs is not fixed. More specifically, if a PRRP is capable of adapting its ideological positions to the grievances of the population, then it can be expected to be more successful.<sup>20</sup> Lastly, the success of PRRP's also depends on whether or not other parties can be perceived as being able to address the grievances of the population. In this

connection, we expect PRRPs to be more successful in countries in which they do not face strong competition for the radical left.

Five hypotheses can be derived from the above discussion, which are summarized below.

#### **Demand-side explanations**

- ⊗ *H1. PRRPs are expected to be successful in countries where the population perceives that **economic inequality** has increased.*
- ⊗ *H2. PRRPs are expected to be successful in countries where the population has more **negative attitudes towards migrants**.*
- ⊗ *H3. PRRPs are expected to be successful in countries where the population is more **Eurosceptic**.*

#### **Supply-side explanations**

- ⊗ *H4. PRRPs are expected to be successful if they **adapt their ideology to the grievances** of the populations.*
- ⊗ *H5. PRRPs are expected to be successful in countries where **PRLPs** are not successful.*

The success of PRRPs is expected to be explained by five explanatory conditions linked to these hypotheses. Rather than being mutually exclusive explanations, the success of PRRPs is expected to result from a complex interplay between these conditions. More specifically, while some the populations of some countries might vote for PRRPs because of economic grievances, other might vote for PRRPs because of their Euroscepticism. However, the presence of any grievance cannot be expected to result in a high radical right vote if PRRPs do not adapt their ideology to these grievances or if PRLP's are better in addressing these grievances.

Aside from the five conditions included in this research, literature suggests several other possible explanations. However, these were not taken into account because the chosen research approach (QCA, cf. infra) works best if only a limited number of conditions is included. First, the type of electoral system that is used during the elections is not taken into account. While prior research shows this is an important

explanation for PRRP-success in national elections<sup>21</sup>, this is not expected to of relevance for European elections, in which the proportional electoral system is used in all member states.<sup>22</sup> Two other conditions were not taken into account because they are difficult to operationalize in structured way for a comparative study: the political space that centrum parties leave open for PRRP's and the strength of the political leaders of PRRPs.<sup>23</sup> Lastly, whether or not voting on European elections was compulsory was not taken into account because prior QCA-runs did not suggest it was relevant for explaining the variation of the outcome.

#### **Research design**

This section introduces the research method and discusses the case-selection, the operationalization, and calibration of the conditions.

Methodologically, this study builds on **fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA)**. This configurational comparative method is particularly apt for examining why an outcome is present in some cases and not in others. This is in line with the objective of this study, which aims to arrive at an explanation why PRRPs had success in some countries during the 2019 European Elections and in others not. Moreover, the method is particularly suited for uncovering a complex form of causation: multiple conjunctural causation. In line the idea of conjunctural causation, we expect our outcome, electoral success, to result from a combination of supply- and demand-side conditions; in line with the concept of multiple causation, we expect different combinations to result in electoral success. The fuzzy set version of QCA was preferred over the crisp set version because the outcome and the conditions vary by degree. QCA can be used to compare an intermediate to large number of cases on three to seven conditions. To be able to explain the variation in the outcome with a limited number of conditions, the study focuses on the fifteen eldest EU member states: Italy, France, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece, Spain, Portugal, UK, Luxemburg, Ireland,

Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Germany. These countries are expected to share a sufficient number of background characteristics to allow for a meaningful comparison.

The crucial for step in fsQCA is the assignment of fuzzy membership scores to the cases on the outcome and the conditions. This process is referred to as calibration. Fuzzy membership scores vary between 0 and 1. Fuzzy scores reach unity if the calibrated outcome or condition is fully present in the case. A score above 0.5 indicates the outcome or condition is more present than absent, a score of 0 indicates it is fully absent. The direct method of calibration was used to assign fuzzy membership scores. First, the raw data used to operationalise the variable is determined. Subsequently, three anchor points must be determined: [1] which corresponds to the full presence of the variable; [0] which corresponds to the full absence and [0,5] which corresponds to the theoretical point at which the variable is equally present and absent. These data and anchor points are then transformed into fuzzy scores using the fsQCA software.<sup>24</sup>

The calibration of the outcome, “**success of PRRP parties**”, first requires the identification of PRRPs in the selected cases. In the present study, a party is a PRRP if they are a member of the right populist fraction Identity and Democracy in the European Parliament or if they are described as radical right parties in the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (2019).<sup>25</sup> In addition to these parties, the Greek Golden Dawn party is also included because it is generally described as neo-Nazis and extreme right.<sup>26</sup> The selected parties are presented in table 1, which shows that two of our cases do not have PRRP: Ireland and Portugal. To measure the success of the PRRPs, we take the percentage of votes they received in the 2019 European elections. The following anchors were used to convert this indicator to fuzzy membership scores. The 0-anchor is fixed at 1 percent, because it makes a distinction between countries where PRRP’s didn’t score at all and countries where success was limited. The 0.5-anchor is fixed at 7 percent because there is a clear division between Spain with 6,28 percent and Luxemburg with 10,03 percent. The 1-anchor is 18 percent because the PRRPs in France and Italy are clearly outperforming the PRRPs of the other countries. The raw data and calibrated scores are presented in table 1.

**Table 1: Fuzzy score calculation**

Member State	PRRP	% votes	votes in Fuzzy scores
Italy	Lega Salvini Premier	34,26	1
France	RN	23,34	0,99
Austria	FPÖ	17,2	0,94
Sweden	SD	15,34	0,91
Finland	Perussuomalaiset	13,8	0,86
Belgium	Vlaams Belang	11,68	0,78
Germany	AFD	11	0,75
Netherlands	FVD	10,96	0,75
Denmark	Dansk Folkeparti	10,76	0,74
Luxemburg	ADR	10,03	0,7
Spain	VOX	6,28	0,41
Greece	X.A.	4,87	0,26
UK	UKIP	3,31	0,14
Ireland	/	0	0,03
Portugal	/	0	0,03

Source: 2019 parliamentary results<sup>27</sup>

The first condition, the (perceived) **“inequality”** in a country was operationalised with the Special Eurobarometer 471<sup>28</sup>, in which the respondents were asked this statement: today, the differences in income are too big in your country. The raw indicator corresponds to the sum of respondents that agreed and strongly agreed to with the statement. The direct method of calibration was applied with the following anchors. The 1-anchor was fixed at 90 percent. The population of Germany, Spain and Portugal clearly think that the income inequality is the biggest in their country. The 0,5-anchor was fixed at seventy-eight, the 0-anchor at sixty-eight because the population in Denmark and the Netherlands clearly experience the least income inequality.

The second condition, **“negative attitudes towards migrants”**, is operationalised using the Standard Eurobarometer 91.<sup>29</sup> In it, respondents were asked this question: what do you think are the two biggest problems facing your country at the moment? The percentage of respondents that picked migration as response was used as the raw indicator. The 0-anchor was fixed at ten percent. The 0,5-anchor is fixed nineteen percent. This is one percent more than the European average of eighteen percent. The 1-anchor was fixed at twenty-five percent. Belgium is the only country where they see migration as the biggest problem and is also has the biggest value in the column.

The third condition, Euroscepticism, is operationalized as **“positive attitude towards the EU”**. The raw indicator is also based on the Standard Eurobarometer 91, in which people were asked whether they have a positive view of the EU. The direct method of calibration was applied with the following anchors. The 0-anchor is fixed at 40 percent, because is a clear gap between the countries that score under 40 percent and the countries that score more than 40 percent. The 0,5 anchor is fixed at 49 percent. If more than 50 percent of a country is positive

towards the EU, then the variable success is more present than absent. The 1- anchor is fixed at 59 percent.

To measure the extent to which the **PRRP adapted its ideology** to the grievances of the population, the Eurobarometer data was combined with the Manifesto Project Data. In the Standard Eurobarometer 91, respondents were asked this question: “what do you think are the two biggest problems facing your country at the moment?” the answer to this question reflect the grievances and fears of the population. In total, there were twelve different response options. For the operationalisation of this variable, the top five answers per country were taken. These top five answers per country are then linked to the party programmes that the PRRPs wrote before the elections. If PRRPs respond well to the grievances of the people, these grievances should be reflected in their party programme. The countries in this research can therefore be given a score between zero and five. A score of zero is given when the party has no grievances of the population in its programme. The score of one is given when the party has one grievance of the population in its programme. The raw data was transformed into fuzzy membership scores with the following thresholds. The 0-anchor was fixed 2,5 because only three countries score less than 2,5. The 0,5-anchor was fixed 3,5; the 1-anchor point at 4,5. Four countries score five out of five and thus separate themselves from the others.

The last condition, **success of PRLPs**, is operationalised as the electoral results of the PRLPs in the 2019 European elections. The 1-anchor was fixed at twelve percent because Greece stands out from the other countries with a strong PRLP. The 0,5 anchor was fixed at seven percent. Spain and Ireland are clearly above the middle ground, but well below Greece. The 0-anchor is five percent.

Table 2 presents the raw and fuzzy data.

Table 2: Raw and fuzzy data

Country	Success of PRLP		Immigration as a problem		Income inequality		Party adapt ideology		Positive EU image	
	Raw	Fuzzy	Raw	Fuzzy	Raw	Fuzzy	Raw	Fuzzy	Raw	Fuzzy
<b>Austria</b>	1,04	0	18	0,42	84	0,82	2	0,01	45	0,21
<b>Belgium</b>	5,57	0,11	28	0,99	81	0,68	4	0,82	38	0,02
<b>Denmark</b>	5,51	0,1	24	0,92	63	0,01	3	0,18	54	0,82
<b>Finland</b>	0	0	16	0,27	72	0,14	5	0,99	44	0,16
<b>France</b>	6,31	0,26	17	0,34	84	0,82	3	0,18	36	0,01
<b>Germany</b>	5,5	0,1	24	0,92	92	0,97	3	0,18	51	0,65
<b>Greece</b>	23,75	1	18	0,42	80	0,62	5	0,99	33	0
<b>Ireland</b>	11,68	0,94	7	0,02	79	0,56	0	0	63	0,99
<b>Italy</b>	0	0	22	0,82	88	0,92	3	0,18	38	0,02
<b>Luxemburg</b>	4,48	0,02	12	0,09	84	0,82	3	0,18	57	0,92
<b>Netherlands</b>	3,37	0	23	0,88	59	0	4	0,82	50	0,57
<b>Portugal</b>	0	0	4	0,01	96	0,99	0	0	60	0,96
<b>Spain</b>	10,17	0,87	16	0,27	91	0,96	4	0,82	44	0,16
<b>Sweden</b>	6,8	0,43	22	0,82	69	0,06	5	0,99	50	0,57
<b>UK</b>	0,59	0	13	0,12	73	0,18	5	0,99	38	0,02

Sources: Special Eurobarometer 471, Standard Eurobarometer 91, 2019 European elections results

## Analysis and results

After the calibration, a truth table can be produced (see table 3). A truth table contains a row for every possible combination of conditions. A row is assigned an outcome of 1 if it is sufficient for the outcome (i.e. always leads to the outcome); and an outcome of 0 if it is not sufficient. Whether or not a row can be considered sufficient depends on its consistency and on whether or not there are contradictory configurations. Consistency is a parameter that varies between 0 and 1; a truth table row is fully sufficient if the consistency parameter reaches unity. A truth table row corresponds to a contradictory configuration if it includes cases in

which the outcome is present and cases in which it is absent. Rows 7 and 9 in the table below correspond to contradictory configurations, given that they include cases in which the outcome is strongly present, i.e. Finland (row 7) and Luxembourg (row 9), and cases in which the outcome is strongly absent, i.e. UK (row 7) and Portugal (row 9) This study considers rows with a consistency above 0.7 as sufficient. Hereby, row 7 was considered as sufficient and row 9 as not sufficient. In consequence, the results will not explain why the populist radical right was not successful in Britain or why it was successful in Luxembourg.

Table 3: Truth table of the analysis

Row	Positive image EU	Immigration as problem	Income inequality	Party adapts ideology	Success PRLP	Outcome	raw consistency	cases
1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	Sweden, Netherlands
2	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	Italy
3	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	Belgium

4	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	Germany
5	0	0	1	0	0	1	0,994	France, Austria
6	1	1	0	0	0	1	0,945	Denmark
7	0	0	0	1	0	1	0,712	Finland, UK
8	0	0	1	1	1	0	0,617	Spain, Greece
9	1	0	1	0	0	0	0,538	Luxemburg, Portugal
10	1	0	1	0	1	0	0,384	Ireland

Sources: Special Eurobarometer 471, Standard Eurobarometer 91, 2019 European elections results

Subsequently, logical minimization is used to minimize the truth table. Depending on the logical remainders (logically possible combinations of conditions for which no cases were included in the study) included in the minimization process, different solution types result. This study focusses on the parsimonious solution, because this solution is guaranteed to identify causally relevant conditions. The parsimonious solution for the presence of the

outcome is presented in table 4. This solution shows that there are two paths towards success of PRRPs. First, the populist radical right will be successful if the population considers immigration as a problem. Second, the populist radical right will be successful if the population does not have positive image of the EU and PRLP's were not successful. However, there was one case that corresponds to this combination, in which PRRPs were not successful: the UK.

**Table 4: Parsimonious solution for electoral success**

	Covered cases
<b>Immigration as a problem</b>	Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Netherlands, Italy and Sweden
<b>~success of PRLP* ~positive image of the EU</b>	Italy, Finland, Austria, France and the UK

[~]indicates the absence of a condition; [\*] indicates a combination of two conditions.

The same procedure was used for the absence of the outcome, which results in the solution presented in table 5. The solution indicate that there are two paths towards the absence of success of PRRP. First, PRRP's will not be successful if PRLP's are successful.

Second, PRRPs will not be successful if immigration is not considered a major problem and if the population has a positive image of the EU. However, there was one case that corresponds to this combination in which PRRPs were successful: Luxembourg.

**Table 5: Parsimonious solution for electoral loss**

	Cases
<b>success of PRLP</b>	Greece, Spain
<b>~Immigration as a problem* positive image of the EU</b>	Ireland, Portugal, Luxemburg

~indicates the absence of a condition; [\*] indicates a combination of two conditions.

## Conclusions

Why were populist radical right parties successful in some EU member states during the 2019 European elections and not in others? This study first developed a theoretical framework with five conditions to explain the striking variation in success of PRRPs in EU member states. In line

with demand side explanations, PRRPs were expected to be successful if the population perceived (H1) an increased economic inequality, (H2) had negative attitude towards migrants and (H3) was more Eurosceptic. In line with supply side explanations, PRRP's were expected to be successful if they (H4) adapted their ideology to the grievances of the population or (H5) did not

face competition from a strong populist radical left party. fsQCA was used to test these hypotheses. The results of the analysis provided evidence for two of the demand-side explanations: a negative attitude towards migrants and the absence of a positive attitude towards the EU were indeed causally relevant for the outcome. In addition, one supply-side explanation was also important: the absence of a strong populist radical left party. In contrast, The analysis did not provide evidence for the importance of economic inequality or the adaptation of ideology to grievances.

However, two cases were not explained in this study: the UK and Luxembourg. Although the British population had a negative image of the EU and there was no successful PRLP, UKIP was not successful at the European elections.

Nevertheless, there was another party that was successful during the European elections in the UK: the Brexit party which also shares many characteristics of PRRPs. Moreover, these elections were less relevant to the British people because the country was leaving the European Union. Luxembourg, in contrast, shares many characteristics with countries where PRRPs were not successful, but nevertheless had a successful PRRP in the European elections. Explaining this contradictory case constitutes an interesting avenue for future research. Next to finding a solution for Luxemburg, it is also possible to start a new research for the thirteen other countries in the European Union. Mainly East-European countries aren't investigated in this research and could be the ideal subject for a future and similar research using the QCA-method.

---

<sup>1</sup> Shaun, Walker, "Far-right 'surge' ends in a ripple", *The Guardian*, May 27, 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/27/european-elections-far-right-surge-ends-in-a-ripple>; "Extremrechts Europarlementslid uit Griekenland gearresteerd in Brussel," *De Morgen*, April 27, 2021, <https://www.demorgen.be/politiek/extremrechts-europarlementslid-uit-griekenland-gearresteerd-in-brussel~bcfb88bc/>.

<sup>2</sup> Michael Minkenberg, and Pascal Perrineau. 2007, "The Radical Right in the European Elections 2004", *international political science review*: 29-55.

<sup>3</sup> Cas Mudde, "Populism: An Ideational Approach", *The Oxford Handbook of Populism* (2017): 1-25.

<sup>4</sup> Cas Mudde, "The populist zeitgeist", *Government and opposition* 39, no.4 (2004): 543.

<sup>5</sup> Cas Mudde, "Populist Radical Right Parties", *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press* (2007).

<sup>6</sup> Jan Willem Duyvendak and Josip Kešić, "The nation under threat: secularist, racial and populist nativism in the Netherlands", *Patterns of Prejudice* 53, no.5 (2019): 441-463.

<sup>7</sup> Cas Mudde, "Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe Today", *Bloomsbury Academic* (2016): 295-307.

<sup>8</sup> Jan Willem Duyvendak and Josip Kešić, "The nation under threat: secularist, racial and populist nativism in the Netherlands"

<sup>9</sup> Cas Mudde, "Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe Today", *Bloomsbury Academic* (2016): 295-307.

<sup>10</sup> Cas Mudde, "Populism: An Ideational Approach"

<sup>11</sup> Cas Mudde, "Populist Radical Right Parties"

<sup>12</sup> Robert Rohrschneider and Nick Clark, "Chapter 5: Second-order elections versus First-Order thinking: How voters Perceive the representation process in a multi-layered system of governance", in *Coordination between Electoral Arenas in Multi-Level Countries* (Madrid: Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, 2009), 143-160.

<sup>13</sup> Elisabeth Ivarsflaten, "What unites right-wing populists in Western Europe? Re-examining grievance mobilization models in seven successful cases", *Comparative Political Studies* 41, no.1 (2008): 3-23.

<sup>14</sup> Markus Wagner and Dennis Cohen, "The centre-right versus the radical right: the role of migration issues and economic grievances", *Journal of ethnic and migrations studies* 48, no.2 (2021): 366-384.

<sup>15</sup> David Weisstanner and Sarah Engler, "The threat of social decline: income inequality and radical right support", *Journal of European Public Policy* 28, no.2 (2021): 153-173.

- 
- <sup>16</sup> Marcel Lubbers and Marcel Coenders, "Nationalistic attitudes and voting for the radical right in Europe", *European Union Politics* 18, no.1 (2017): 98-118.
- <sup>17</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>18</sup> Catherine De Vries and Erica E. Edwards, "Taking Europe to its extremes", SAGE publications 15, no. 1 (2009): 5-28.
- <sup>19</sup> Herbert Kitschelt and Anthony J. McGann, "The radical right in Western Europe: A comparative analysis," *University of Michigan Press* (1997).
- <sup>20</sup> Maik Fielitz and Laura Lotte Laloire, "Trouble on the Far Right: Contemporary Right-Wing Strategies and Practices in Europe", *Bielefeld: Transcript* (2016); Herbert Kitschelt and Anthony J. McGann, "The radical right in Western Europe: A comparative analysis," *University of Michigan Press* (1997).
- <sup>21</sup> Peter John and Helen Margetts, "The latent support for the extreme right in British politics", *West European Politics* 32, no.3 (2009): 496-513.
- <sup>22</sup> "Infopagina's over de Europese Unie", *Europees Parlement*, last modified May 2022, <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/nl/sheet/21/het-europees-parlement-verkiezingsprocedures>.
- <sup>23</sup> Hanspeter Kriesi et al, "*Political Conflict in western Europe*". Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2012); Kai Arzheimer and Elisabeth Carter, "Political opportunity structures and right-wing extremist party success", *European Journal of Political Research* 45, no.3 (2006): 419-443; Filipa Figueira, "Why the current Peak in Populism in the US and Europe? Populism as a Deviation in the Median Voter Theorem", *European Journal of Government and Economics* 7, no.2 (2018): 154-170; Antonis A. Ellinas, "Chaotic but popular? Extreme-right organization and performance in the age of media communication", *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 17, no.2 (2009): 209-221.
- <sup>24</sup> Charles Ragin and Sean Davey (2017), "*fsQCA version 3.0*", Irvine: University of California.
- <sup>25</sup> Chapel Hill Expert Survey," *Chapel Hill Expert Survey* (2019), <https://www.chesdata.eu/>.
- <sup>26</sup> "Extreemrechts Europarlementslid uit Griekenland gearresteerd in Brussel," *De Morgen*, April 27, 2021, <https://www.demorgen.be/politiek/extreemrechts-europarlementslid-uit-griekenland-gearresteerd-in-brussel~bcfb88bc/>; Leslie Hodge, "Leider van Griekse neonazipartij Gouden Dageraad veroordeeld tot dertien jaar cel," *VRT NWS*, October 14, 2020, <https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2020/10/14/leider-van-gouden-dageraad-veroordeeld-tot-dertien-jaar-cel/>.
- <sup>27</sup> Resultaten Europese 2erkiezingen 2019. (z.d.). Europees Parlement. Accessed March 9, 2022, <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/election-results-2019/nl>
- <sup>28</sup> "Special Eurobarometer 471: Fairness, inequality and intergenerational mobility", *European Commission*, April 2018, <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2166>
- <sup>29</sup> "Standard Eurobarometer 91 – Spring 2019", *European Commission*, August 2019, <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2253>