EU Membership for Georgia, a Step Too Far? Policy Report on the Future Relations Between the EU and Georgia

By Milan Claeys

Promoted by Prof. Dr. Sven Biscop

[September 2025]

This policy report examines what future relations between Georgia and the EU could and should look like. For a long time, accession appeared to be the natural end point, yet recent developments in Tbilisi and the decision to halt talks have put that assumption into question. The analysis weighs European interests against geopolitical constraints and Georgia’s internal obstacles. It becomes clear that membership is not achievable under current circumstances. Simply maintaining the present situation or stepping back from the candidacy would also erode European influence. A more pragmatic relationship is therefore needed, built on cooperation where possible and opposition where necessary.

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Introduction

On 14 December 2023, the European Council granted Georgia candidate status (European Council, 2023). At that time, it seemed like a logical step. The EU has some clear interests in this strategically located country. This also happened in the context of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The Kremlin is populated by imperial nationalists who see Western influence in the post-Soviet space as a threat (Kuzio, 2024). This Russian attitude, in turn, poses a threat to European interests. Georgia's role as a connectivity hub for energy and trade is particularly important to Brussels. Should Russia pursue its imperial ambitions in Georgia, there is a lot at stake for the EU. Therefore, it seems important to bring the country into the EU as quickly as possible to cement the ties between Tbilisi and Brussels. However, today it looks as if this will not happen as quickly as first thought. There are many difficulties ahead.

First of all, there are external and geopolitical obstacles to membership. Although its position on the world map is seen as a very strategic one, it is also a geopolitical isolated one. To the north lies Russia, which considers Georgia, as a post-Soviet country, to be its own backyard. To the east, the country borders Azerbaijan and is close to the Caspian Sea. To the south, it borders Turkey, with whom the EU has a complex relationship, and Armenia, also an isolated country. The Black Sea borders the west of Georgia (De Waal, 2019). This isolated position makes it difficult to provide assistance should Russia attack.

Furthermore, there are also Georgian internal obstacles that make accession to the EU very difficult. Most importantly, is the re-election of Georgia’s ruling party: Georgian Dream. The party has been in power since 2012, but is increasingly sceptical about the EU and clearly looking to Russia for the future. Observers and EU politicians thought that the parliamentary elections would bring change and that the united opposition would win a majority, opening the way to the EU. The victory of Georgian Dream, therefore, comes as a surprise, and the EU does not seem to have a clear response (Malerius, 2024).

In the light of the given obstacles that are preventing EU accession, the question begs itself whether EU membership is the best way to defend European interests, or do geopolitical realities and/or internal politics stand in the way, requiring us to look for a different kind of relationship?  To find a solution to this question, three important research questions need to be asked.

1. What are the EU's interests in Georgia?
2. What are the main problems/risks standing in the way of membership?
3. Is granting membership the most efficient way to serve the EU's interests in Georgia?
4. If not, what might an alternative policy look like?

Why Georgia matters to the EU

This chapter explores the different interests Brussels has in Georgia and why it pushes towards Georgian integration into the EU. Without an understanding of those interests, it is impossible to make a proper analysis and determine whether membership is the right step at this point in time.

It is important to note that this chapter only considers these interests from the perspective of the EU, not from the perspective of Georgia.

a. European grand strategy in the Caucasus

In order to identify the EU's interests in the South Caucasus region, and more specifically Georgia, it is important to draw attention to the EU's grand strategy. The EUGS focuses on “principled pragmatism”, which prioritises a world order based on general rules. Furthermore, the document also endorses the protection of the EU itself (Biscop, 2021). The European strategy also addresses the EU's attitude towards its neighbours in the east and south. It prioritises the “resilience of the state and society”. The EU sees this resilience as “the ability of a society to reform and thus prevent or withstand internal or external crises”(EUGS, 2016). This resilience is of great importance to the EU because a resilient state is a secure state. According to the EUGS, this security ensures prosperity and democracy.

Although much has changed since the publication of the EUGS, its essence remains the same. The EU benefits from a stable and resilient Georgia that lives up to European values and standards. To this end, the EU uses various policy instruments: the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the Eastern Partnership (EaP), and association agreements, including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs). So from this point of view, European accession seems like a logical step to make sure Georgia is and remains a resilient state.

b. Georgia as a connectivity hub

The country's geographical location, between Asia and Europe, makes Georgia an important hub for trade between China and the EU on the one hand, and as a transit country for the Union's energy supplies on the other. Since the war in Ukraine, this importance has only grown, because Brussels wants to become less dependent on Russian gas and on trade transported across Russian territory. Gas from the Caspian Sea region and trade via the Middle Corridor offer a convenient alternative. The importance therefore, clearly lies in the diversification of supply countries and routes.

In the field of energy, the most important role for Georgia is as a transit country. It hosts parts of the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline (BTC), and the Black Sea Submarine Cable (BSSC). These pipelines and cables connect Azerbaijan and the energy-rich Caspian Sea region with the EU.

The SGC is the most important of the three. Azeri gas flows through this pipeline into the EU. Shortly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the EU closed a deal with Azerbaijan to invest in its energy infrastructure in exchange for doubling gas exports to the EU by 2027 (Von Der Leyen, 2022). In the last quarter of 2024, Azerbaijan accounted for 7% of all gas entering the EU via pipelines (DG Energy, 2025).

The BTC and BSSC, which transport gas and electricity to the EU, respectively, are currently less important but will gain in significance in the future. Kazakhstan made announcements that it wants to send a part of its oil export to the EU through the BTC (Putz, 2025; Temirgaliyeva, 2025). The BSSC still needs to be built, but it is clear that electricity will play an increasingly important role in the energy mix (Van de Graaf & K. Sovacool, 2020). Azerbaijan has excellent solar and wind energy resources and significant prospects for biomass, geothermal energy, and hydropower (International Energy Agency, 2023).

Trade faces a similar situation to energy. Here too, Georgia plays a role as a transit country on a route that has become increasingly important since Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Before the invasion, 86% of all trade between China and the EU by land passed through Russia (World Bank, 2023). However, the EU wants to diversify its land trade in order to reduce its dependence on this Russian trade route. The EU's trading partners are also looking for new routes that do not pass through Russia. European sanctions are also making this route increasingly unattractive for them (IISS, 2023). The EU and its trading partners are therefore increasingly looking to the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), better known as the Middle Corridor (MC). This route connects China with the EU via Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Black Sea, and/or Turkey.

The EU recognises the importance of investing in this route and has already pledged €10 billion through the Global Gateway. It intends to use this money primarily to invest in the infrastructure of the MC (European Commission, 2024). But also, China sees the MC as an opportunity and is competing with Brussels for control of the MC. Brussels already lost a contract for the construction of a new deep-sea port in Anaklia to China (Civil Georgia, 2024; IISS, 2023).

We can therefore conclude that, from an energy and trade perspective, it is and will remain important for the EU to keep Georgia within its sphere of influence and to limit Russian and Chinese influence on the country and its energy and trade sectors as much as possible.

c. Control over the Black Sea as a security interest

In addition to its role as a transit country, Georgia also has other strategic interests for the EU. Georgia is one of the coastal states of the Black Sea, or a riparian state. The importance of having such an additional riparian state in the EU, alongside Romania and Bulgaria, should not be underestimated. Due to the enclosed position of the Black Sea, which is only accessible via the two Turkish straits, the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, and the power of Turkey to regulate passage through these straits, an additional coastal state is of great value. The Montreux Convention brings access to the Black Sea strongly under Turkish control. It determines a maximum number of non-riparian states' ships, and it gives Turkey the power to close the two straits (League of Nations, 1936). This severely limits European power projection in the region (Isachenko & Swistek, 2023). Georgian accession to the EU would strengthen Brussels' clout in the region.

There are multiple reasons why the EU would want to strengthen its position in the Black Sea. The protection of connectivity lines, such as the BSSC and the MC, is one example (Delcour, 2023). As the situation in the Baltic shows, cables are very vulnerable to sabotage(Jack et al., 2025). Furthermore, an increased military presence in the Black Sea due to Georgia's accession is also useful for the defence of the EU's eastern flank (Siman, 2022). In addition, this increased presence will also be necessary in certain scenarios if the EU wishes to provide Ukraine with a security guarantee in the future and protect it from Russian aggression (Biscop, 2025).

Georgian accession to the EU would definitely strengthen Brussels' position in the Black Sea and expose the need for a genuine Black Sea strategy.

d. Credibility of European enlargement policy

A final issue at stake for the EU in Georgia is the credibility of its enlargement policy. After all, the EU has granted Tbilisi the status of candidate member of the European Union (European Council, 2023). Backtracking or freezing accession could have major consequences for the EU, both in Georgia, the entire Caucasus region, and the rest of the world. According to Vos (2017), enlargement policy is sometimes the most efficient form of EU foreign policy, because it enables the EU to completely transform countries in line with European standards and values. It is therefore not a tool that we want to lose or see weakened.

Should the EU withdraw or freeze Georgia’s candidate membership, the Georgian government could then tell the people that the EU does not want them. Such a rejection could destroy the faith that the pro-Western part of the population has in the EU. It would impact the pro-European population in other candidate states as well (Giuashvili, 2025). Georgia would set a dangerous precedent for others. They, too, would see how Georgia can continue to benefit from the EU, as it has EU-granted privileges, without having to reform itself, as the candidacy is frozen. Countries such as Serbia and North Macedonia, which are already lagging behind in meeting European conditions, would see such a freeze on Georgia's membership as a free pass to follow the same path. Like Georgia, they could then enjoy the ‘best of both worlds’ by continuing to postpone accession (Bechev, 2024). This phenomenon poses a real threat towards the European enlargement policy. Ruling elites in those countries could use pro-European rhetoric as a smokescreen to attract EU investments or financial support and to appease the pro-European population.

Key obstacles to membership

The previous chapter explores why Georgia matters to the EU. Given the EU's interests in the region, membership seems to be nothing more than a logical step. But there is more. As mentioned in the introduction, Georgian membership is not a reality today, nor does it seem likely to become one in the near future. That’s because there are a lot of obstacles preventing membership. This policy report divides those obstacles into two categories: geopolitical obstacles and Georgia’s internal politics.

a. Geopolitical obstacles

The EU is not alone in recognising Georgia's importance. Other players compete for influence in the strategic country. Russia in particular sees Tbilisi historical as its own sphere of influence (Biscop, 2021). The Kremlin's grand strategy therefore, focuses on strengthening its power in those post-Soviet states (Russia Matters, n.d.).

Russia sees the actions of the EU, like the EaP, as a direct threat to its own strategy (Cadier, 2014). So Georgian membership in the EU is a red line for the Kremlin. The Russian invasion of 2008 is a clear example of how far Russia is willing to go to prevent Tbilisi from joining the Western bloc. (De Waal, 2019). Ukraine suffered the same fate in 2014 and later in 2022. It therefore seems rational to say that if you cross Russia's red lines, you'd better prepare for war (Mearsheimer, 2014). This analysis does not want to go as far as Mearsheimer, who argues that the war in Ukraine is the fault of the West; on the contrary. But it seems accurate that misguided analyses of Russian intentions and failed diplomatic efforts caused the West to fail to anticipate the Russian invasion of 2022 (Van Bladel, 2025). The West cannot and must not make such an analytical error again. This analysis, therefore, argues that if the EU ever allows Georgia to become a member of the Union, it can expect Russia to do everything in its power to prevent this, even if that means military action. According to Van Bladel (2025), it is not only NATO expansion that Russia sees as a threat to itself. EU enlargement plays an equally important or even more important role.

Military experts are taking such a scenario into account. Military historian Simoens (2025) warned on X. that Putin often refers to the borders of Tsarist Russia, which included Georgia. He described the situation as alarming. During a guest lecture at Ghent University, a high-ranking Belgian military officer considered the Russian military threat in Georgia to be very high.If the EU decides to make Georgia a full member, it is obligated, by Article 42.7 of the EU, to defend Georgia should Russia attack (EUR-LEX, n.d.).This analysis of Russia’s intentions in Georgia makes clear that Moscow will not let Tbilisi go without a fight. So the next question is the following: Is military defending Georgia a realistic scenario for the EU? The answer is simple but harsh: no.

The first reason why defending Georgia would be difficult for Brussels is that it’s unclear who would organize that defence. The EU’s collective defence almost completely coincides with that of NATO. So the members are counting on NATO for their own defence. But Georgia is not a member of NATO, and given the aversion that the American president Trump seems to have for NATO, a new round of expansion seems rather unrealistic (Daalder, 2025; GIP, 2024). So the task would fall solely on the shoulders of the EU. Difficult talks about a European pillar in NATO and the forming of Coalitions of the Willing in Ukraine show how hard it is for the EU to form a complete military force capable of facing Russia without the US.

Even if a European force could be assembled, a military operation in Georgia seems impossible. This is due to the country's isolated location. Since it borders no other members, the EU would face a difficult job transporting military equipment or forces to Georgia. Russia’s anti-air defences cover a large part of Georgia and the surrounding airspace (Batashvili, 2022). Those S-400 systems would pose a serious threat to European planes (Bronk, 2022; Hwang et al., 2022). Sending aid over sea and landing European troops on Georgia’s shores is also impossible. It seems unlikely that Turkey would grant passage to the Black Sea, as it wants to keep its power granted by the Montreux Convention (Isachenko & Swistek, 2023). Amphibious operations are also very complex and dangerous (Petraeus & Roberts, 2023). The last option would be to travel overland. But then Brussels would have to seek help from the Turks again, as this is the only possible route. Even if Ankara agreed and let European troops land in Turkey, it would probably be too late. Such an operation would take too long, and Georgia does not have the strategic depth to wait for reinforcements.

These two reasons support the negative answer to the question of whether the EU is capable of defending Georgia. This puts Georgian membership in the EU in a different perspective.

b. Georgia’s internal obstacles

Next to these geopolitical obstacles, there are also some internal obstacles to accession. Those difficulties can be categorized into three different groups: internal political problems, the failure of the EU programs, and the occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The following subchapters will explore those three obstacles and why they are making Georgian membership difficult.

i. Georgian Dream is not a European dream

On 26 October 2024, Georgian Dream won the elections in Georgia. With 54% of the votes, it won 89 of the 150 seats in parliament. This victory came as a surprise in European capitals and in the headquarters of Georgia’s pro-European opposition. International observers like De Waal (2024) are talking about a stolen election, and even the European Union called for new and fair elections (European Parliament, 2024). But as of today, the situation stays the same and Georgian Dream remains in charge, despite national and international protests. A look into the evolution of GD’s vision on European integration learns how hard accession will be if the party remains in power.

Georgian Dream has ruled Georgia since 2012. Only in the first four years, they need to form a coalition. Later, they won the majority of seats each time. In the beginning, the party claimed to be a pro-European party. During its first term in office, it also expanded ties with the EU and kept the Kremlin at arm's length. Everything therefore, pointed to GD's pro-European intentions (Coene, 2016). Even during the 2020 elections, “EU accession in 2024” was still one of Georgian Dream's most important election promises. It was during the term of office after 2020 that GD began to deviate from the path of European integration. In particular, Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 caused a break in the trend within GD. The party began to strengthen ties with Russia again and send mixed signals to the EU. By the 2024 elections, European integration was no longer among Georgian Dream's election promises, and the focus was much more on conservative and religious values, something that is in line with Russian ideology. In addition, GD also warned of a new war with Russia if it continued on its Western course (Kandelaki, 2024). During this period, since 2022, GD also repeatedly sought confrontation with the EU, the well-known foreign agents bill being a clear example of this. It also refused to participate in the various sanctions packages against Russia and regressed on the conditions set by Brussels for Georgian membership (Gavin & Parulava, 2024). During the 2024 election period, it also lashed out at the EU on several occasions, accusing Brussels of wanting to plunge Georgia into war. GD also clearly reached out to anti-democratic forces in the EU, such as Orban (Kakachia, Kakhishvili, et al., 2024). After its election victory in 2024, Georgian Dream also officially halted accession talks with the EU (Parulava, 2024). In addition, the State Security Service of Georgia accuses the West of conducting disinformation campaigns (Civil Georgia, 2025b).

This analysis makes clear that Georgian Dream has no real ambition to join the European Union. This is reinforced by a growing agency that the Caucasus countries see for themselves. They realise their strategic location and don’t want to be part of just one bloc. They play a hedging role and use transactional politics to achieve their goals (Akhvlediani et al., 2025). This fits GD’s rejection of the EU bid.

ii. Failing EU Policy

Another problem that makes Georgian membership to the EU rather difficult is the failing policy instruments Brussels uses to pull Tbilisi closer to the EU. As already mentioned above, those are mainly the ENP, the EaP, and the DCFTA. They are not currently delivering the desired results.

Vos (2017) argues that the European Neighbourhood Policy has never really worked, due to the difficulty of providing a highly diverse region with a single comprehensive policy. The more specific EaP is also experiencing difficulties in Georgia. It is becoming increasingly difficult to keep Tbilisi on the path towards the EU. On the EaP index of the EaP Civil Society Forum, the country's score fell to 0.63 in 2023, down from 0.68 the previous year (the maximum score is 1). This still makes the country the second-best performer, just behind Ukraine (0.66). But it is mainly the negative trend that is causing great concern. The EU set 12 conditions for progress towards membership, three of which have already been met. But the other nine keep causing problems. (Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, 2023).

The DCFTA has also not yet had the desired effect. Georgia continues to represent only a small proportion of EU trade, less than 1%, and the EU's share of Georgian trade has not increased since the start of the DCFTA. On the contrary, Georgian exports are actually declining. The main problems relate to non-tariff barriers and Georgia's insufficient production capacity. As a result, Tbilisi is unable to take full advantage of access to the European single market (Akhvlediani, 2024).

Next to these failing policy tools, there is also the weak European response to the Georgian Dream's disputed election victory. Although a resolution was passed in February 2025, including measures like not recognising the GD government and the new president, revoking visa-free travel for Georgian diplomats and officials, calling for new elections, condemning the brutal repression of the protests, and several other points.

Despite these measures, the European response does not seem to be enough. High Representative Kallas has not yet visited Georgia, nor have other members of the EU leadership. EU sanctions remain blocked by Hungarian and Slovak vetoes.

iii. Occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia

A third obstacle within Georgia itself is the status of the two de facto independent republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These two regions violently seceded after Georgia gained independence in 1991, both receiving Russian support. In 2008, Tbilisi attempted to reclaim the territories, which led to fierce Russian resistance. Moscow sent its army to Georgia to defend Abkhazia and South Ossetia and won that war. Since then, the two territories have been de facto independent (De Waal, 2019).

Russia keeps supporting the two ‘republics’ and invests in its military and civil influence in both regions. Abkhazia and South Ossetia each have a Russian military base (Rogozińska & K. Olech, 2020). Moscow is also building a new naval base in the Abkhazian town of Ochamchire to strengthen its power on the Black Sea (Chatterjee, 2023).  Russia is building infrastructure there that serves both civilian and military purposes as well. It has reopened the airport in the Abkhazian capital Sukhumi, for example, in violation of international law (Prelz Oltramonti, 2025).

This situation greatly complicates the path towards European integration. Tbilisi does not have effective control over the entire territory (De Waal, 2019). If Georgia eventually becomes a member of the EU, it will most likely be without Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It is safe to say that the Kremlin will not let go of the two de facto republics, given its investments in ports, airports, and other infrastructure. The Russian military presence also reinforces this view. However, such accession without control over the entire territory is not impossible. It has even been done before. Cyprus also joined the EU in 2004 despite the fact that a large part of the island falls under the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and is de facto independent (Ker-Lindsay, 2011).

Future outlook: scenarios for EU-Georgia relations

The future of EU–Georgia relations is far from straightforward. Brussels faces a difficult choice: how to safeguard its strategic interests in Georgia without putting itself in an impossible position vis-à-vis Russia, and how to deal with Georgia’s internal challenges at the same time. Traditionally, the European Union has three options: allow Georgia to become a member of the EU, maintain the status quo, or officially withdraw its candidacy. This policy analysis also proposes a fourth option. In this scenario, the EU would explore alternative ways of cooperating with Georgia.

a. Georgia becomes a member of the EU

In this scenario, the EU and Georgia succeed together in converting the candidacy into effective membership. The emphasis here is on the word “together”. Because that is extremely important in this context. As the chapter on internal difficulties shows, Tbilisi has a strong agency over its own fate. After all, they largely determine what their future will look like. It is Tbilisi that must make the final decision to resume its path towards the EU.

This scenario scores highly when it comes to defending European interests in Georgia and beyond. As the chapter on European interests shows, there is a lot to benefit from Georgian membership. But the feasibility of this scenario is a problem. At this moment, there is no reform-minded government in Tbilisi, and given the harshness with which GD is suppressing the protests, this does not seem likely to change in the future either. Furthermore, as discussed, the Russian threat is real, rendering accession impossible.

This low feasibility and the high risks associated with Georgian membership mean that this analysis must conclude that Georgian membership of the EU is not desirable or even possible in the near future.

b. Status quo

This scenario essentially represents a continuation of the status quo. This means that Tbilisi will continue to postpone accession talks, and the EU will make no serious attempt to put accession back on the table. Relations between Tbilisi and Brussels will then continue to be conducted through existing mechanisms such as the ENP and EaP.

At first glance, such a scenario does not seem too bad. Brussels can defend its interests as it does now, without seeking confrontation with Russia. But this analysis dives deeper and discovers that the status quo is, in fact, a negative trend. The decline in the EaP index and the Chinese construction of the port in Anaklia are clear proof of this statement (Civil Georgia, 2024; Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, 2023). Not only do Russia and China compete for power with Europe, but Turkey also looks for opportunities to exploit Europe's weaknesses (Holslag, 2025). This means that Europe will lose influence over its own interests. 

If the EU fails to act and keeps the status quo, there is a very high probability that the scenario outlined here will become reality. This would clearly jeopardise EU interests and is not a desirable scenario for Brussels.

c. The EU withdraws Georgia's candidacy

Such a scenario would actually mean an extremely accelerated status quo scenario. This scenario has already been elaborated in the previous chapter. Withdrawing the candidacy would have roughly the same consequences. However, these would probably occur even more quickly and be even more extreme. Because if the initiative to withdraw the candidacy comes from Brussels itself, it could break the spirit of the pro-European population. Without European support and prospects, Georgian Dream could sell the rejection as proving they were right all along. There would then probably be less protest and resistance against GD. The party could complete the consolidation of a one-party state undisturbed. They would then feel even more emboldened in their confrontation with the EU and their transactional approach to foreign policy.

Elites such as GD in other candidate countries, who are actually striving for more domestic power but are or want to become candidate countries for the sake of appearances and the pro-European population, will also see this. They can then sell to voters the idea that the EU is abandoning candidate countries. This would again have a negative effect on enlargement policy (Bechev, 2024).

d. EU seeks new type of partnership with Georgia

None of the above scenarios seems to be entirely to the EU's advantage at present. Such a scenario with only advantages is highly unlikely, but Brussels must nevertheless consider how it can achieve better results. A new type of partnership with Georgia seems to be the order of the day. A partnership tailored to the country, seeking a balance between cooperation with Tbilisi, where possible, and opposition where necessary. It is a more pragmatic approach that must be pursued without linking it to the entire normative EU package.  The EU must recognize that Tbilisi largely holds the keys to cooperation.

In order to achieve such pragmatic and more transactional cooperation, this analysis makes a number of recommendations. The EU must:

1. Realize that Georgian membership is impossible, but it can’t withdraw the candidate status at the moment. It would have serious consequences.
2. Deepen sectoral cooperation. Focus on areas where EU and Georgian interests overlap: energy transit, connectivity through the Middle Corridor, and stability on the Black Sea. It must help Georgia fulfill the full potential of the DCFTA.
3. Communicate clearly what it does in Georgia and which investments it makes. It's important to sell a story.
4. Play a mediating role between the pro-European population and the government. It can’t abandon the pro-European population. It must do this at a high political level. Upgrading the role of the EUSR for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia could be an important step in this regard.
5. Work on a new grand strategy. The EUGS is outdated. Furthermore, qualified majority voting within the CFSP also appears to be necessary in order to effectively implement a new EUGS. A Black Strategy is also key for future relations with Georgia.
6. Develop tools to better defend member states and candidates against foreign interference in elections and irregularities on election day itself. Only in this way can there be hope that the pro-European opposition will return to power in Georgia.

Conclusion

This policy report posed four questions:

1. What are the EU's interests in Georgia?
2. What are the main problems/risks standing in the way of membership?
3. Is granting membership the most efficient way to serve the EU's interests in Georgia?
4. If not, what might an alternative policy look like?

Chapter 2 explored the different interests of the EU in Georgia. Summarized, they are the strategic location Georgia has as a transit country for

energy and trade, the need for resilient neighbours, control over the Black Sea, and the credibility of the EU and its enlargement policy. All these interests would benefit from Georgian membership.

Chapter 3 explains why Georgian accession to the EU is not a reality today. Geopolitical obstacles like the Russian threat pose a huge risk to Georgian membership. Furthermore, Georgia’s ruling party, Georgian Dream, clashes with Brussels over the conditions of membership and has postponed further negotiations. The current EU policies are not able to keep Tbilisi on the right track.

So this analysis can only conclude that Georgian membership is impossible and will not happen even in the near future. The EU simply does not have the tools to pull Georgia into the EU. As long as there is no change in that feasibility and the risks, the analysis surrounding this will not change either. The EU cannot force Tbilisi to implement reforms, it cannot change Russia's strategy and view of the post-Soviet states, and it cannot give Georgia a different place on the world map.

For the first time, the EU is encountering active opposition from another country to its enlargement policy (Biscop, 2024). Brussels will have to learn to deal with this and try to make the best of it through the proposed policy. Otherwise, it risks losing all its influence.

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