The Geopolitical Gambit of Climate Action: Analysing the EU and China’s Green Investments in Africa as Tools of Influence

By Guus Maebe

Promoted by Prof. Dr. Jan Orbie

[September 2025]

This paper examines the geopolitical dimensions of the global green transition. As decarbonisation increases the demand for critical raw materials (CRMs), access to these natural resources has become a strategic priority. China leads in this race through its Belt and Road Initiative, while the EU seeks to reduce dependency by investing via its Global Gateway Initiative, particularly in Africa. Using a qualitative comparative case study with geopolitical mapping and a four-dimensional geopolitical scoreboard, this inquiry reveals that after four years after the launch of the Global Gateway, the balance of power in African green investments remains in disequilibrium in favour of Beijing.

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Introduction

At the twenty-first Conference of the Parties (COP), 196 countries signed the Paris Climate Agreement pledging to limit the global temperature rise to 1.5°C. Achieving this goal requires a 43% reduction in greenhouse gas emission by 2030 and the world must reach zero-emissions by 2050 (Hu, 2025; Jacobson et al., 2017; UNFCCC, 2025). This requires a worldwide green transition which led to a significant 30% increase in the demand for Critical Raw Materials (CRMs), such as lithium, cobalt, and nickel, that are essential to produce decarbonised energy solutions like wind turbines, solar panels, or batteries for electric vehicles (EVs) (de Cunzo et al., 2023; Giuli, 2023; Kalantzakos, 2019; OECD, 2023; Reisch, 2022, Vivoda et al., 2024). Nevertheless, the manufacturing of renewable technologies consumes even more raw materials in comparison to fossil fuelled counterparts. For instance, to successfully get an EV on the road, the production process for its batteries requires lithium, cobalt, nickel, manganese, and graphite, which amounts to six times the mineral input compared to a conventional vehicle (IEA, 2021). In fact, a report published by the UN Environment Programme states that a global decarbonising shift needs over 600 million tonnes of additional CRMs to be successful (IRP, 2017).

However, CRMs are geographically concentrated in only a few regions, making a secure access a strategic priority (IRENA, 2023; Kalantzakos, 2019). As states compete to secure supply, a new geopolitical race for resources has emerged (Giuli, 2023; Nohadani, 2025; Vivoda et al., 2024). China has taken a leading role through its infrastructure-driven Belt and Road Initiative (BRI, launched in 2013) and now dominates most CRM supply chains, leaving the EU heavily dependent on Beijing’s reserves (Ali, 2024; Cooper, 2024; Logan, 2024; Pindyuk, 2023; Xémard, 2025). In response, the EU introduced the Global Gateway Initiative (GGI) in 2021 to provide a geopolitical alternative to China’s BRI by investing in resource-rich countries and diversifying its access to CRMs (Le Mouel and Poitiers, 2023).

Both initiatives have a clear geographical focus on the commodity-rich African continent, which is reminiscent of a twenty-first Century Scramble for Africa where foreign powers are trying to get roots in the soil (Belkacem, 2024; Cabestan, 2023; Heldt, 2023). The Scramble for Africa refers to the late nineteenth-century period when European powers rapidly colonised and competed for territory across Africa, seeking to exploit its abundant natural resources (Sheposh, 2023).

Given that is has been four years since the launch of the GGI and considering the significant impact of the green transition on great power dynamics, it is opportune to reassess the current distribution of power between the EU and China in Africa in relation to CRMs (Scholten et al., 2020). Therefore, this dissertation aspires to find an answer to the following research question: “What is the balance of power between the EU and China in Africa regarding green investments in the context of the global green transition since the launch of the Global Gateway Initiative?”

The Geopolitics of the Green Transition

Albeit the green transition is necessary to keep the global average temperature below 1.5°C by the end of this century, it also comes with a geopolitical price (Jacobson et al., 2017). Similar to the impact that fossil fuels had in shaping the geopolitical map, CRMs are emerging as the twenty-first-century equivalent. However, in this green era, the summum bonum will now shift from oil and gas to CRMs that are only available in certain parts of the world, posing threats to a state’s resource security (Dalby, 2003; Giuli, 2023; IRENA, 2023; Munteanu, 2024).

The geographically concentrated landscape of CRMs

Unlike renewable energy production, which can be decentralised, CRM supply chains are deeply concentrated and oligopolistic. This is because only a handful of countries dominate the global output and the demand for CRMs is inelastic as there are few viable substitutes available (Chen et al., 2024).

Concretely, Chile (23%) and Peru (11%) supply most copper, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) produces 71% of the global cobalt supply, and the ‘Lithium Triangle’, consisting of Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile, collectively account for 56% of the world reserves of lithium. Similarly, South Africa controls 90% of platinum-group metals, and China and Russia together represent 57% of the global Rare Earth Elements (REEs) reserves (Chen et al., 2024; Vakulchuk et al., 2020).

As a result, the asymmetric distribution and global scarcity of CRMs induce state actors to perceive them as strategic commodities fuelling a geopolitical race (Giuli, 2023).

Winners and losers of the green transition

The decarbonisation of the world economy will quadruple the demand of CRMs by 2040, redistributing the geopolitical influence (Bordoff and O’Sullivan, 2021). As a result, resource-rich countries will enjoy an intensified geopolitical influence, while traditional fossil-fuel exporters risk losing it.

Overland et al. (2019) created a ‘Geopolitical Gains and Losses’ (GeGaLo) index which illustrates these shifts. Major fossil-fuel importers, such as Sweden, Iceland, and New Zealand will improve their geopolitical positions by becoming less dependent on volatile energy imports, whereas oil-exporting economies such as Russia and Saudi Arabia will forgo energy-related power. Yet, others argue that major powers such as the EU, the US, and China could benefit as they have the technological and industrial capacities to evolve towards energy self-sufficiency by investing in renewable energy sources (Van de Graaf, 2018).

However, these indexes mainly focus on renewable energy alternatives but do not account the presence of CRMs. The International Energy Agency (IEA) argues that countries rich in CRMs gain geopolitical influence through the same scarcity-based logic inherent to fossil fuels (Wang et al., 2023). These natural resources are critical to green energy technologies and global trade is expected to surge as the share of CRMs in energy-related trade will increase to 50% in 2050 (Bordoff and O’Sullivan, 2021). However, as with fossil fuels, the so-called ‘resource curse’ may re-emerge as abundant minerals can lead to corruption, internal conflict, and economic volatility (van der Ploeg, 2010; NRGI, 2015). These conditions allow for a high degree of foreign influence, especially as roughly half of all CRMs are found in fragile or politically unstable states (Narh, 2023; Sachs and Warner, 1995; Umbach, 2020).

China’s dominance in the race for CRMs

Beijing was one of the first global actors that recognised the strategic importance of CRMs at least two decades ago and has systematically built dominance across the entire supply chain. Through its BRI, China negotiated numerous ‘minerals-for-infrastructure deals’ across Africa, often via state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that enjoy subsidies and political backing (Benabdallah, 2024). Unlike European stakeholders, which are expected to comply with strict Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) standards, Chinese companies can negotiate more flexible giving them a comparative advantage (Logan, 2024; Pindyuk, 2023).

At present, China holds an unparalleled position as it controls around two-thirds of the global nickel refining, 59% of lithium, and 73% of cobalt, while producing 69% of the Rare Earth Elements (REEs) and over 80% of the world’s solar-panel components (Castillo and Purdy, 2022; Cooper, 2024; Hayley, 2024; IEA, 2022; Yang, 2023). Consequently, China is the only country that can go through all phases, from mining to processing, and eventually manufacturing the end products, putting it in a monopoly position (Xémard, 2025).

Furthermore, the first manifestation of the geopolitical threat of Chinese dominance in CRM is reflected in the 2010 rare-earth export ban to Japan and the recent export restriction targeting the US in retaliation of Trump’s tariff war (Bockstaele, 2025; Pamment et al., 2019). These incidents show the detrimental effect of the leverage that the PRC possesses and the need for strategic autonomy and de-risking to safeguard economical and energy security (Ali et al., 2024). If not, the green future could in fact be red (Allison, 2021).

European Strategic Autonomy

The multipolar shift in the geopolitical landscape, along with the digital and green transition, forced the EU to rethink its economic, industrial, and foreign policy. According to Bradford (2020), the EU is a ‘regulatory superpower’ which can unilaterally adopt European regulations which will be followed by the rest of the world as access to the biggest economic market outweighs stringent EU-rules. This phenomenon is called the ‘Brussels Effect’, and the EU has been passively enjoying the accompanied benefits. However, growing geopolitical rivalry has reduced the effectiveness of purely regulatory power as global powers see the capacity to set standards and ensuring market access as highly strategic objectives (Dullien and Hackenbroich, 2022).

The European industry policy revolved around efficiency manifested through ‘just-in-time’ production. Nevertheless, this modus operandi appears to be vulnerable for (malicious) disruption as attested by the COVID-19 Pandemic (2020) and the Energy Crisis (2022). Great power competition tends to weaponize supply chains of CRMs and demonstrates the necessity for a diversified supply and domestic stock (Dullien and Hackenbroich, 2022). If not, third countries could become overly dominant within a supply chain constituting a chokepoint which gives them leverage to impose high prices, conditions, or just cut off access entirely (Farrell and Newman, 2019; Szczepański, 2020).

To date, the Union’s import reliance (i.e. European dependence on imports from third countries) was very high. The EU is almost entirely dependent on external supply for ten out of the sixteen CRMs essential for multiple renewables. Within this context of dependency, China plays a significant role as supplier in the chain, leaving the EU systematically vulnerable (Alcidi et al., 2023).

As a result, strategic autonomy is a top priority of Ursula von der Leyen’s ‘geopolitical Commission’ to safeguard EU independence in global affairs (Beaucillon and Poli, 2023; Teevan, 2024). One of the key remedies to diversify supply routes is to create new capacity by investing in resource-rich countries. Given that the Critical Raw Materials Act predominantly focuses on domestic measures, the EU draws on the Global Gateway as its principal policy tool to make these strategic investments in third countries (Le Mouel and Poitiers, 2023).

Conceptual and Analytical Framework

Conceptual framework

The main objective of this dissertation is to analyse the power struggle between the EU and China on the African continent. In order to do so, this inquiry focuses on the ‘green investments’ of both powers to safeguard the supply of critical materials necessary for the green transition. The term green investments is used here in a dual sense. On the one hand, it refers to investments aimed at acquiring CRMs; on the other hand, it also encompasses investments in connecting infrastructure (i.e. ports, railways, and roads) that facilitate the extraction and transport of these materials.

Analytical framework

In the context of the 1973 oil crisis, the Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APERC) introduced a framework where it assesses four A’s (i.e. availability, accessibility, acceptability, and affordability) to determine the ‘energy security level’ (Siksnelyte-Butkiene et al., 2024). This framework can also be used in this context as energy security refers to safeguarding a stable and diversified supply of energy sources, which the race for CRMs exactly entails (Jones and Dodds, 2017).

Nevertheless, as stated by Nunzi (2025), the framework of the four A’s is ‘slippery’ due to the multidimensional and polysemic nature of energy security which depends on the energy source. As a result, the framework is not a one-size-fits-all concept but should be tailored to the specific context.

Accordingly, this inquiry draws on a customised version of the four A’s framework – ‘the four A’s of geopolitical influence’ – using availability, accessibility, acceptability, and alignment as factors to analyse the distribution of power between China and the EU.

Availability (1) assesses the extent of each actor’s access to CRMs, operationalised through the quantity, nature, and geographical spread of mining investments. Accessibility (2) examines the infrastructure that supports transport and export of CRMs, such as ports, roads, and railways. Thirdly, acceptability (3) replaces the original APERC environmental focus with an analysis of the perceptions among African populations as soft power and local legitimacy shape long-term influence (Nantulya, 2018). Lastly, alignment (4) substitutes ‘affordability’ to capture the political convergence between the EU and China and the respective African states where the investments take place.

Methodology

This inquiry employs a qualitative comparative case study approach focusing on the two cases: the EU and China, while Africa serves as the site of observation. The analysis unfolds in two phases; first, all green investments are visualised on a geopolitical map followed by the construction of a comparative geopolitical scoreboard.

First phase: Geopolitical mapping

The green transition is seen as a fundamentally geographical process that entails the reshaping of existing spatial patterns of economic activity. Safeguarding the access to CRMs will inevitably create new patterns (i.e. the geographical linkages between one space and another). However, these linkages constitute dependency and control (Bridge et al., 2013). Using QGIS-software, an open-source Geographic Information System, this inquiry maps the CRM extraction sites and the related infrastructure investments on a geopolitical map.

To feed the map with data, this study draws on a wide range of official EU and Chinese documents, company websites, media outlets, and databases such as AidData and the African Centre for Strategic Studies. While transparency is higher on the European side, the opacity of Chinese data may result in an underestimation of Chinese green investments in Africa.

Each identified investment is visualised by converting the exact coordinates into a tangible dot on the map. These ‘dots’ are categorised using symbols and a colour code to differentiate both actors. This map forms the empirical basis for evaluating the first two A’s: availability and accessibility.

Second phase: Geopolitical scoreboard

The second phase involves translating the insights from the geopolitical map and its underlying data into a comparative geopolitical scoreboard complemented by additional data structured by the four A’s of geopolitical influence framework.

The two first A’s, availability (1) and accessibility (2), both focus on the quantity, the nature, and the geographic spread of the green investments. Therefore, these two dimensions rely on the same underlying dataset visualised by the geopolitical map, making it obsolete to collect identical data twice. Subsequently, acceptability (3) uses Afrobarometer’s ‘Round 10 National Surveys’ to gauge the public perception of China and the EU in African states where investments occur. These percentages serve as proxies for soft-power appeal. Finally, political alignment (4) is measured through the UN General Assembly (UNGA) voting behaviour. Following Dreher et al. (2008), the alignment score represents the proportion of resolutions in which a relevant African country casted the same vote as either the EU (approximated by France and Germany as the EU is merely and observer member at UNGA) or China. Only resolutions where the EU and China disagreed are considered, as these instances are the most indicative for political alignment or divergence (Wittkopf, 1973).

The final geopolitical scoreboard synthesises all the qualitative and quantitative results for the EU and China in a comparative table. The findings are not constructed using a numerical index but draws on the directional balance across the four dimensions which is made clear in the discussion of each ‘A’ and visualised by the flag of the ‘winning’ power.

Findings

Availability

In figure 1 below, the green investments concerning CRM extraction sites are depicted by the symbol of a crossed hammer and pick which is a traditional symbol to indicate mining activities in cartography. The EU’s mining projects are presented in blue while the Chinese in red. The same goes for the ports and the corridors which are either roads or railways depending on the symbol as seen in figure 2 ut infra. It is important to clarify that ‘Ports’ are listed as ‘CRMs datapoints’ while being ‘Infrastructure datapoints’ due to technicalities inherent to the QGIS-software programme.

To begin, there is a clear discrepancy between the quantity of EU mining projects compared to Chinese projects. In total, there were 9 European CRM green investments identified, while China accounts for 36. Of course, Beijing’s BRI (2013) was launched much earlier than the European GGI (2021), giving it a significant head start. On top of that, the EU still upholds stricter ESG standards compared to its Chinese counterpart (Logan and Acheampong, 2025). It was only until 2022 that the EU closed its first relevant strategic partnership through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Namibia in the margin of COP27 (European Commission, 2022). One year later, this partnership was brough into practice with specific investments in graphite production used in batteries. Ever since, the EU has signed four other MoUs on CRMs with the DRC, Rwanda, Zambia, and again with Namibia (European Commission, 2023; European Commission, 2025b).

Moreover, under Regulation (EU) 2024/1252, the European Commission (2025a) launched a first list of 13 strategic projects in 2025 that focus on CRMs in third countries. Four of those projects are located on the African continent: the Kobaloni Energy project (Zambia), the Songwe Hill Rare Earth project (Malawi), the Maniry Graphite Mine project (Madagascar), and the Zankopsdrift project  (South Africa). These projects complement 47 strategic domestic initiatives that were introduced under the Critical Raw Materials Act.

Furthermore, the European ‘AfricaMaVal’ project was launched under the ‘Horizon Europe programme’ simultaneously with the GGI to locate those raw materials included in the CRMs list created by the European Commission. This initiative aims to facilitate (new) strategic partnerships with African countries by identifying which CRMs are present in each country. At the completion of this dissertation, AfricaMaVal has carried out ten in-depth case studies, two of which (i.e. Namibia and the DRC) have resulted in signed MoUs (AfricaMaVal, 2024).

On the other side, Chinese green investments are far more numerous and mainly concluded by Chinese SOEs such as China Nonferrous Metal Mining Group (Sinomine) and Zijin Mining Company. Because of this way of operating, there is a potential risk of underestimating the number of green investments done by China as these are not consistently and transparently published to the wider public. Nevertheless, this inquiry identified 36 Chinese mining operations that focused on extracting CRMs on the African continent in the context of the BRI.

Subsequently, a wider variety of CRMs enables more technological and industrial flexibility while facilitating greater strategic autonomy. In terms of diversification of the supply chains, China takes the lead again with investments in eleven different kinds of CRMs (i.e. bauxite, aluminium, graphite, REEs, manganese, cobalt, copper, lithium, niobium, PGMs, and nickel) while the EU has access to only six (i.e. bauxite, aluminium, graphite, REEs, manganese, and cobalt).

Geographically, EU investments are mainly focused on Central and Southern Africa, while Chinese investments are carried out across multiple African regions, spanning nearly the entire continent. Of course, in the region of the Sahel green investments are non-existent because of political instability, violent extremist organisations, and the fact that CRMs are far more scarce or unable to be discovered due to the former reasons (Center for Preventive Action, 2024). Nevertheless, according to the AfricaMaVal case studies, the EU is looking into countries such as Morocco (North Africa) and Senegal (West Africa), which could improve its geographic spread significantly.

In conclusion, across quantity, nature, and geographic spread, the balance is currently in disequilibrium with the EU falling short on all three dimensions. China maintains more mining investments, granting Beijing access to nearly twice as many CRM types and securing a presence in almost every corner of the continent. Nevertheless, the Union is getting into motion with its recent strategic projects and the ambitions of the AfricaMaVal project.

Accessibility

Green investments also include infrastructure that enables extraction and transport of the CRMs. Figure 2 below visualises all transport corridors containing the relevant roads, railways, and ports. The dotted lines are corridors, while the symbols clarify whether it is a road (truck) or a railway (train). Besides that, ports are depicted as container ships.

With the launch of the GGI, the EU started betting on infrastructural projects to counterbalance the highly infrastructure-driven Chinese BRI. This is also apparent in the green investments done by the EU as it invested in five infrastructural initiatives on the African continent.

A first European project is the ‘Green Corridor’, which is a 2,600 kilometres road connecting the mineral-rich Kivu region with Kinshasa in the DRC. This project enhances the connectivity to facilitate transport of multiple important commodities across the country (European Commission, 2025c). Secondly, the ‘Lubumbashi – Durban Strategic Corridor’ is part of a €4.7 billion investment to connect the cobalt-rich region of Lubumbashi (DRC) with the port of Durban (South Africa). The investment does not only entail the establishment of a highly functioning railway between the two countries, but also expenditures to update the port infrastructure in South Africa (Hodgson, 2025). Furthermore, the ‘Lobito Corridor’ is a transnational railway which crosses Zambia, the DRC, and Angola to connect the Copperbelt in Zambia and the Katanga Province in the DRC with the Atlantic Ocean in Angola (European Commission, 2023d). The DRC and Zambia are two of the biggest copper producers in the world, making this investment highly lucrative (OECD, 2025). Subsequently, alongside the operationalisation of the strategic partnership with Namibia, the EU concluded investments to further develop the Port of Walvis Bay marking the end of the ‘Maputo Corridor’ which is an established trade route supported by the EU connecting Namibia with Mozambique (European Commission, 2023). Lastly, in July 2025, the EU announced a new Team Europe Initiative (TEI) to develop a railway along the Maputo Corridor to connect the Port of Maputo with the Mozambican town Ressano Garcia right at the border with South Africa. This new addition to the Corridor facilitates bilateral trade and constitutes a key role in transporting CRMs to the Port of Maputo (Delegation of the EU to Mozambique, 2025; Dossa, 2025).

On the other side, China’s BRI has produced a much denser network of 25 projects (see below) on the African continent, including five key transport corridors. First of all, the Tazara Railway can be seen as the Chinese equivalent of the European Lobito Corridor as it also departs from the Zambian Copperbelt and the copper- and cobalt-rich Province of Katanga (DRC) but ends at the Port of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. In 2024, Beijing announced an investment of $1 billion to refurbish the railway together with plans to expand the Port of Dar es Salaam to scale up its productivity (Gregory and Milas, 2024; Yu, 2024). Secondly, another 282 kilometres long railway corridor which ends in the Port of Dar es Salaam was constructed to connect the Tanzanian port with a nickel mine in the neighbouring country Burundi. This $2.2 billion project facilitates the transport of approximately 3 million metric tonnes of nickel ores per year (Bloomberg, 2025; Chen, 2025; Reuters, 2025). Next, China invested $9.5 billion to construct a 900 kilometres long railway to transport bauxite and aluminium from the landlocked Mali to ports in both Dakar (Senegal) and Conakry (Guinea) (Al Mouahidi, 2015; Hogg, 2014; Oirere, 2014). Finally, the last two projects are both concentrated around the Santou bauxite and aluminium mining zone in Boké (Guinea). The first investment of $1.2 billion connects the mining site with the Port of Dapilon (Guinea) with a railway which covers 135 kilometres including 23 newly constructed bridges (Nan, 2020; Railway Gazette International, 2020). The other project entails a road going from Boké to Québo located in the neighbouring country Guinea-Bissau. This road serves as a new trade route for bauxite and aluminium and amounted to $39 million construction costs (Klein, 2023).

The infrastructural green investments of both powers are quite diverse with multiple investments in roads, railways, and ports. However, when it comes to ports, China comes top with 20 projects across the continent. Beijing’s focus on port development stems from the Maritime component of the BRI which enables China’s leading position as exporter and trading nation. With 95% of China’s trade going through sea lanes, ports are essential infrastructural links in its value chains. Between 2010 and 2019, Chinese SOEs invested approximately $11 billion into overseas ports (Runde et al., 2024).

Evidently, the geographical spread of the infrastructural projects is closely intertwined with the location of the mining investments across the continent. Therefore, EU’s infrastructural investments are again limited to Central and Southern Africa while Chinese infrastructural projects are scattered around the continent. Especially the high number of Chinese involvements in port development gives Beijing an advantage in this dimension.

Although both the EU and China recognise infrastructure as the backbone of resource security, the balance of power is here in disequilibrium tilting towards China. Its continent-wide network of railways, roads, and especially ports far exceed the EU’s green investments. Nevertheless, the EU is slowly catching up in this dimension, especially through its ‘Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa’ where eleven strategic corridors in Africa were identified for the Union to explore (European Commission, 2025d).

Acceptability

Table 1 below includes those 13 countries for which Afrobarometer has published results from the ‘10^th Round of National Surveys’. The analysis of the African public opinion towards green investments of the EU and China in their countries starts with the overall trend, followed by country-specific observation, and ends with a conclusion.

Even though both percentages are quite low, on average, the PRC (51.7%) enjoys a higher acceptability rate compared to the EU (42.4%). Especially in those cases where China is active in the country in question, there is usually a higher positive perception rate. However, this is not a pattern as illustrated by Malawi where China (44.2%) is not active and still receives a higher acceptance rate than the EU (39.9%) which is active. Additionally, the EU only has a couple of cases where it got a higher perception rate when active (i.e. Ghana and Madagascar) disproving this pattern again.

On the country-level, the public sentiment in Mali (79.4%), Gabon (60.6%), and Tanzania (60.6%) is strongly pro-China. China also enjoys a high acceptance rate in Guinea (66.6%) but the gap with the EU (54.8%) is far less considerable compared to the former cases. Moreover, the EU (33%) derogates heavily from China (50.7%) in Zambia.

At the same time, the EU has a higher acceptance rate in Madagascar (58.8%), Ghana (44.9%), and Zimbabwe (36.7%), even though the latter is negligible as China comes very close with 34.6%. Lastly, Namibia is the only country where both powers are active while the public acceptance rate is quite positive and nearly similar. The EU enjoys 56.1% and the PRC 57.6%.

Considering that the average percentage of acceptability across the 13 examined African countries results in 51.7% for China against only 42.4% for the EU, the balance of power is again in disequilibrium favouring the former.

Alignment

Political alignment was measured through UN General Assembly voting similarity across 207 resolutions. The last ‘A’ follows the same structure as section 6.3 above. Nevertheless, table 2 below does contain all 21 African countries as demarcated by the geopolitical mapping.

The average political alignment with China is 57.9% compared to just 17.6% for the EU. Furthermore, the dissenting votes, where the included countries did not follow China nor the EU, account for 24.6% on average.

Upon closer analysing the various voting trends, some countries are aligning more evident with China than others. Zimbabwe (74%), Eritrea (72%), Algeria (71.5%), and Mali (69.1%) show the highest political alignment with Beijing. Compared to the acceptability rate (see section 6.3), China performs well in Mali, scoring highly in both political alignment (69.1%) and public acceptance (79.4%). Nevertheless, this cannot be seen as a pattern as Zimbabwe shows that political alignment (74%) (‘the perception of the elite’) and public acceptance (34.6%) can differ significantly.

Moreover, political alignment with the EU is generally non-existent. Only Malawi (34.8%), Botswana (24.2%), and Ghana (23.7%) show some modest similarity. Nevertheless, these percentages are still far below the average alignment with Beijing. Additionally, when comparing with the acceptability rate, Madagascar emerges as a notable case where the political alignment (18.4%) differs greatly with the acceptance rate (58.8%) by the African citizens.

Finally, a last noteworthy case is the DRC, which records the highest percentage of dissenting votes (49.3%). This elevated figure is largely due to the frequent choice to abstain from voting (non-vote) while the EU (i.e. France and Germany) and China almost never used this option.

Based on the average political alignment monitored over 207 cases, China takes the lead again with an average of 57.9% compared to only 17.6% for the EU. Generally speaking, this means that well over half of the time, the voting trend of the PRC is followed by the included African countries. Consequently, the political alignment dimension is in disequilibrium.

Geopolitical Scoreboard

Table 3 below gives a summarising overview of the four dimensions comparing both the EU and China. The winning power is depicted using its official flag.

Final outcome

As shown in table 3, all four dimensions remain in disequilibrium, with the balance consistently tipping towards China. Accordingly, the outcome of this geopolitical scoreboard and the answer to the central research question: “What is the balance of power between the EU and China in Africa regarding green investments in the context of the global green transition since the launch of the Global Gateway Initiative?”, is that after four years since the GGI, China continues to lead the scramble for access to CRMs in the green transition. In other words, the balance of power on the African continent between the EU and China in the context of the green transition is still in disequilibrium favouring Beijing.

Conclusion

This master’s dissertation discussed the pivotal position of CRMs in the context of the green transition and the emergence of renewable energy technologies. Through the Global Gateway Initiative, the EU is challenging the contemporary dominant Belt and Road Initiative in its search for strategic autonomy to reduce its dependence on foreign CRM supply chains. This inquiry aspired to give an updated assessment of the distribution of power between the EU and China in Africa in relation to CRMs.

By adopting a qualitative comparative case study, both the EU and China were analysed in two phases. First, QGIS-software was used to visualise all green investments made by both powers into a geopolitical map showing the quantity, nature, and geographic spread of the projects. Secondly, a geopolitical scoreboard was established to compare the EU and China across four dimensions ranging from the investments in CRM extraction and infrastructure (i.e. availability and accessibility) to public perception and political alignment (i.e. acceptability and alignment).

The final geopolitical scoreboard revealed that after four years since the launch of the GGI, the balance of power still tips towards China. In terms of availability, China keeps dominating in sheer numbers of CRM projects across the whole of Africa which cover a much wider range of different types of CRMs compared to the EU. Beijing also largely outperforms the EU on accessibility with its major focus on port development in line with its ‘Go Out’ strategy which is part of the Maritime pillar of the BRI. Nevertheless, the EU is getting underway both in the field of CRMs through its AfricaMaVal project as in infrastructure through its Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa. Subsequently, with an average acceptance rate of 51.7% compared to 42.4% for the EU, China scores the highest on the acceptability dimension. Lastly, the most obvious disequilibrium entails the average political alignment, where the EU knows an average of only 17.6% against 57.9% for China.

This geopolitical race clearly demonstrates that it is no longer a question whether Africa’s CRMs will be central to the green transition, but rather who will determine the terms of their use. The outcome will echo far beyond the African continent and will influence climate action, international politics, and the very architecture of power in the twenty-first Century.

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