International competitiveness of offshore wind: Trade flows, tariffs and supply chain dependence

By Dr. Pablo Muylle, Prof. Bruno Merlevede & Prof. Marten Ovaere

[June 2026]

Pablo Muylle is a researcher at the Department of Economics at Ghent University. He is part of the BE-WISE research team. He has expertise in Belgian and European industrial policy, state-owned firms, and global value chains.

Bruno Merlevede is an Associate Professor of Economics at the Department of Economics at Ghent University. He is part of the BE-WISE research team. He has expertise in international economics, multinational firms, global supply chains, and firm productivity.

Marten Ovaere is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the Department of Economics at Ghent University. He is part of the BE-WISE research team. He has expertise in energy and environmental economics, electricity markets, and offshore wind and other renewable energy.

Executive summary

This report examines the international competitiveness of the European and Belgian offshore wind energy (OWE) industry using bilateral trade data for wind turbines and key industrial components identified as critical to the OWE supply chain under the Net-Zero Industry Act (NZIA). It complements the trade flow analysis with an assessment of market access conditions, specifically tariff barriers and non-tariff measures (NTMs), that shape the competitive environment in which EU and non-EU producers operate. The analysis yields four main findings.

Main findings

The EU remains the world’s dominant exporter of wind turbines, but its lead is narrowing as China scales up. The EU remains the world’s leading wind turbine exporter, accounting for 54% of global exports in 2024 and posting a strong Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) of 2.6. It is also a net exporter in 7 of the 10 NZIA component categories analysed. That lead rests on a manufacturing base spread across Germany, Denmark, and Spain. That position has nevertheless weakened in relative terms: the EU’s global export share in wind turbines fell from about 80% in 2007 to 54% in 2024, while China’s rose from 2% to 36% (Figure 1). China now accounts for over 70% of new global offshore wind installations, and its manufacturers are increasingly using that domestic scale to expand abroad. Chinese turbine sales into the EU remain concentrated in onshore markets rather than offshore wind, but the competitive pressure is clearly intensifying

Supply-chain vulnerability is concentrated rather than broad-based, with permanent magnets the single clear weak point. China accounts for 74% of EU imports of permanent magnets, and the corresponding HHI of 0.56 is far above the usual threshold for high concentration. This is fully consistent with the wider literature on rare earth and magnet dependence, even if different policy documents sometimes report higher figures because they use different scopes or product definitions. Most other component categories appear diversified at the aggregate level, with no single non-EU country accounting for more than 20% of imports. The main caveat is steel towers: China’s direct share has fallen sharply, but this has coincided with a surge in Turkish tower exports to the EU. Turkey now accounts for 57% of extra-EU tower imports, which warrants closer scrutiny even though trade data alone cannot prove circumvention.

A pronounced tariff and regulatory asymmetry favours Chinese exporters over EU producers. The EU’s market for OWE components is among the most open in the world: the mean applied tariff on OWE imports is approximately 1.3%, and most product-partner combinations are duty-free. China, by contrast, charges 6-10% on virtually all OWE imports from the EU, and China is explicitly named in the NZIA’s implementing regulation as a supplier concentration risk. Non-tariff measures compound this imbalance: China imposes more than twice as many product-specific regulatory barriers as the EU (∼31 distinct NTM types per OWE product vs. ∼13 for the EU), with particularly extensive use of technical barriers to trade and export controls. The EU’s low tariffs on its most China-dependent imports create a “supply chain trap” that limits the EU’s ability to deploy trade defence instruments without raising costs for domestic manufacturers.

Belgium is not a turbine manufacturer, but it holds defensible niches in foundations and gearboxes. In foundations and floaters, Belgium accounts for approximately 9% of EU exports in this category (RCA of 1.8), reflecting the presence of Smulders, a leading fabricator of transition pieces, jackets, and other offshore wind structures; Belgium’s Relative Trade Balance for foundations has strengthened over time, from 0.28 in the early 2010s to 0.40 in 2022-2024. In gearboxes, Belgium accounts for approxi mately 6% of EU exports (RCA of 1.5), reflecting ZF Wind Power’s manufacturing operations, a global leader in wind turbine gearboxes whose Belgian facility serves European and global markets. These are 2007 2008 the clearest Belgian strengths in the goods data and are consistent with known firm-level evidence on 2009 2010 Smulders and ZF Wind Power. Belgium’s role in offshore wind centres on specialised heavy-industry 2011 2012 2013 capacity in specific components, reinforced by strong port and logistics infrastructure. Belgium’s main 2014 2015 concentration risk is different from the EU average: it lies less in direct non-EU dependence and more in 2016 2017 reliance on Germany as a key supplier for turbines and generators. Belgium’s contribution to the OWE 2018 2019 value chain is also likely understated by goods trade data: Belgian companies, including Jan De Nul and 2020 2021 DEME, are significant global providers of offshore wind installation and marine engineering services that are not captured in HS-based trade statistics.

Policy implications

Policymakers should concentrate on permanent magnets, the one clear dependence on China in the data, and should resist treating every part of the supply chain as equally at risk, since most components are bought from a wide enough range of countries. They should also watch how Europe’s openness interacts with that dependence: the products Europe relies on China for most already enter at very low tariffs, which is exactly where raising trade barriers would do the most harm to European manufacturers. Belgium, for its part, should build on what it already does well, namely foundations, gearboxes, and the installation and engineering services that the goods-trade data miss, rather than try to match larger turbine-producing countries. These points are developed in Section 8.

Methodological note: Only one of the product codes used in this analysis (HS 850231, wind turbines) is specific to wind energy, and it does not distinguish between onshore and offshore turbines. Results for other NZIA component categories should be interpreted as indicative of broader industrial trade patterns rather than OWE-specific flows.